SOURCE: AP
Anti-Syrian
regime protesters hold a banner and Syrian revolution flags during a
demonstration in the town of Haas in the northwestern province of Idlib,
Syria.
As
President Barack Obama and his national security advisors continue to
weigh the costs and benefits of providing greater financial and materiel
support for elements of the Syrian opposition—potentially including
lethal aid—it is important to understand the structure of the Syrian
opposition, which remains plagued by many divisions.
Supporting
the foundation of a cohesive future government of Syria is one the core
objectives of the United States, as the Center for American Progress
has stated in the past. The success or failure of efforts to form a more
cohesive opposition will shape the ongoing effort to advance a
transition in power from President Bashar al-Assad, as well as the
stability of a post-Assad Syria. In order to understand the viability of
U.S. policy options in Syria in both the near and long terms, a
thorough understanding of the Syrian opposition—including its structure,
leadership, funding sources, and internal divisions—is needed.
It
is important to understand that information about the various rebel
groups operating in Syria is limited. Policymakers and analysts are
reliant on in-country reporting by the small number of journalists and
intelligence officers operating in Syria, leading to gaps in knowledge,
conflicting information, and a range of estimates that varies widely on
the size of the rebel groups. In addition, obtaining reliable
information is complicated by the fluid situation on the
ground—alliances shift, rebel groups change in size and structure, and
the relations between these groups evolve. That being said, a basic
outline of the Syrian opposition can be pieced together through the
information available in open- source reporting.
This
issue brief outlines the official organization of the political and
military elements of the Syrian opposition, along with the informal
relationships and interactions between these groups, in an attempt to
provide policymakers with a more accurate picture of the anti-Assad
rebellion.
Limited national coordination
Two
main organizations form the national structure of the Syrian
opposition. The National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition
Forces, also known as the Syrian Opposition Coalition, and the Supreme
Joint Military Command, or SMC, are provisional bodies, formed in
November and December 2012, respectively, with significant support from
the international community. These two interconnected but independent
bodies aim to coordinate a cohesive, national, and democratic opposition
that could fill the potential power vacuum following President Assad’s
fall.
There
is a sizable discrepancy, however, between the structure that these
bodies attempt to impose on the opposition movement, and the chaotic,
disorganized nature of the various rebel groups on the ground that they
represent. The Syrian Opposition Coalition and SMC are designed to
impose a top-down national strategy and governing structure for the
political and military arms of the Syrian opposition, using their
international political, financial, and military support as leverage
with in-country rebel groups.
Instead,
the two bodies have displayed a limited ability to manage or control
the myriad of opposition groups and civilian councils in Syria. They
receive bottom-up legitimacy from in-country groups, which voluntarily
pledge a degree of loyalty to these two national organizations in order
to receive materiel and financial support from the international
community. In practice, the Syrian Opposition Coalition and SMC are the
international faces of the Syrian opposition and act to secure resources
for the rebellion but have so far been unable to provide the internal
cohesion or strategy they were designed to create.
The National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces
The
National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, also
known as the Syrian Opposition Coalition, or SOC, has been recognized as
the legitimate political representative of the Syrian people by the
United States and the majority of the international community but has
not yet been recognized as the legal representative of the Syrian
people. It was formed in November 2012 at a conference held by Syrian
opposition groups in Doha, Qatar, based on veteran dissident Riad Seif
’s Syrian National Initiative proposal.
Objectives
The
Syrian Opposition Coalition seeks to represent and coordinate the
political elements of the Syrian opposition and unite them around a
provisional government that would govern Syria following the collapse of
the Assad regime. It is designed to provide international donors with a
legitimate, unified channel for all aid to the rebellion by acting as a
moderate umbrella group representing the majority of activists,
militia, and local councilmen in the Syrian opposition. The formation of
the SOC would, in theory, allow the Syrian opposition and the
international community to isolate and marginalize more extremist
elements of the rebellion.
Leadership
The
Syrian Opposition Coalition is made up of 71 representatives of key
opposition groups, including the Syrian National Council, the Muslim
Brotherhood of Syria, the Syrian Revolution General Commission, Local
Coordination Committees, local revolutionary councils from across the
country, individuals with long histories of opposing the regime, and a
small number of Kurdish political leaders. Ghassan Hitto, a
Western-educated businessman strongly backed by the Syrian National
Council and the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected prime minister of the
Syrian Opposition Coalition’s transitional government in March 2013.
Moaz al-Khatib, a moderate Islamist opposition leader, served as
president of the SOC from its formation in November 2012 until his
resignation this April following a dispute over Hitto’s election as
prime minister. George Sabra—a Christian teacher, former communist, and
chief of the Syrian National Council—is serving as the interim president
in Khatib’s absence.
Internal divisions
The
Syrian National Council—an organization founded in October 2011 in an
attempt to form a unified opposition framework—is one of the Syrian
Opposition Coalition’s main constituents, and current and former members
of the Syrian National Council make up roughly half of the SOC’s
leadership. Both Hitto and the Syrian National Council have deep ties to
the Muslim Brotherhood, a point of conflict within the Syrian
Opposition Coalition’s leadership and among its international backers.
More
moderate opposition leaders such as former president Khatib have pushed
for a transitional government—one that combines leadership of the
opposition with members of the current Syrian government—as a means of
retaining the governmental structure and avoiding chaos in the
transition to an elected-civilian government. Prime Minister Hitto and
members of the Syrian National Council have instead pushed for the
formation of a provisional government, which would replace the current
Syrian government and exclude all members of the Assad regime.
International
backers have supported their preferred factions within the Syrian
Opposition Coalition in an attempt to shape the political direction of
the organization. Qatar and Turkey, who both have close ties with the
Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and share some ideological elements of their
platform, supported Hitto’s election as prime minister. Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates, who are deeply suspicious of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s influence within the nascent political organization, have
been supportive of Khatib and members of his faction within the SOC.
As
a political entity composed primarily of exiled Syrians—many of whom
have not been in the country for months or years—the Syrian Opposition
Coalition is frequently criticized by rebel groups for being out of
touch with the in-country rebellion, contributing to its limited
credibility on the ground. Whether or not it is able to effectively and
prudently disperse the foreign aid it receives will likely determine its
standing among rebel groups.
Funding
The
Syrian Opposition Coalition receives political and financial support
from Western and Arab states alike. Its primary backers are the United
States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
The Supreme Joint Military Command
The
Supreme Joint Military Command, or SMC, was officially formed to act as
the Defense Ministry of the Syrian Opposition Coalition, yet it
functions on its own authority. Rebel commanders from across Syria—260
in all—participated in its foundation in December 2012.
Objectives
The
SMC’s primary goal is to unite the various armed groups in the
rebellion and gradually form a national army by establishing a formal
chain of command, though in practice little effort has been made by the
SMC to control ground units, as its commanding officer publicly
admitted. The SMC would then develop a cohesive national strategy by
coordinating regional militias, existing provincial-level military
structures, and international supply chains. As part of this process,
the SMC was designed to reduce the influence of extremist groups in
Syria by serving as the principal channel for all international
financial and materiel aid.
Composition
The
SMC comprises a council of leaders from various armed opposition groups
and coalitions across Syria. The level of coordination between these
armed groups and the SMC varies group-to-group. The council of leaders
includes representatives from the Free Syrian Army, the Syrian
Liberation Front, the Syrian Islamic Front, independent brigades,
regional military councils, and defectors from the Syrian army. The
council is made up of 30 elected members split evenly to represent the
country’s five geographic fronts: eastern, western/middle, northern,
southern, and the district of Homs. The council has no structural
hierarchy, and command across the five fronts is not uniform. Instead,
the SMC’s legitimacy is bottom-up, voluntarily given by the commanders
that comprise it but with little coercive power by the SMC to control
local commanders.
SMC
Chief of Staff Gen. Salim Idriss—a former general in the Syrian army
and current commander of the Free Syrian Army—is viewed primarily as a
political leader rather than the head of a top-down chain of command.
Gen. Idriss was chosen to facilitate coordination between the SMC, the
Syrian Opposition Coalition, and the Free Syrian Army due to his strong
relationships with foreign officials and international suppliers of arms
and equipment. The SMC receives direct military aid from a number of
Western and Arab states and has vowed that it will only disperse this
aid to approved rebel groups operating under the SMC structure.
Funding
The
SMC receives financial, materiel, and limited lethal support from
Western and Arab states alike. Its primary backers are the United
States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
Various armed opposition groups
The
Syrian armed rebellion, often discussed as a singular movement working
in unity to overthrow President Assad, is more accurately described as
an array of ideologically diverse and uncoordinated brigades and
battalions with limited areas of operation. One high-ranking U.N.
official recently estimated the number of armed militias operating in
the Syrian rebellion at “more than a thousand.” These anti-Assad groups
range from defectors of the Syrian army to civilians with no formal
military training to fighters affiliated with terrorist organizations.
Some
brigades and armed groups have developed a degree of ideological and
tactical cohesion by operating in larger coalitions such as the Free
Syrian Army, the Syrian Liberation Front, or the Syrian Islamic Front.
But even these coalitions are merely allied groupings of disparate
brigades from across Syria and do not adhere to a uniform command
structure. Despite the unifying goal of ousting President Assad, these
alliances and their subunits have a range of tactics, constituencies,
and visions of what a post-Assad Syria should look like.
The Free Syrian Army
The
Free Syrian Army, or FSA, is the largest group within the Syrian armed
opposition. It is an umbrella group comprising small, ideologically
moderate, and uncoordinated militias and battalions operating at local
levels. The FSA’s leadership is fully incorporated into the SMC and is
closely linked to the Syrian Opposition Coalition. The term FSA has
often been used to describe the overall armed opposition to the Assad
regime, but, in practice, the FSA is one of several alliances of rebel
groups operating in Syria.
Composition
The
FSA is made up of small, localized battalions from all across Syria,
organized loosely through provincial military councils. These battalions
tend to fight in small geographic areas in defense of their hometowns
and are less ideologically driven than others. It is estimated that
there are as many as 50,000 fighters who align themselves with the FSA.
Command
Commanders
of FSA-affiliated brigades and battalions do not receive strategic or
tactical orders from FSA and SMC leaders such as Gen. Idriss but instead
operate unilaterally in the control of their forces. The FSA
leadership’s primary responsibility is to facilitate coordination
between battalions. Gen. Idriss is officially the commander of the FSA
but serves as more of a political leader than as a field commander.
Funding
The
FSA receives financial, materiel, and limited lethal support from
Western and Arab states through the SMC, as well as individual donors
and informal funding streams.
The Syrian Liberation Front
The
Syrian Liberation Front, or SLF, also known as the Syrian Islamic
Liberation Front or Jabhat al-Tahrir al-Souriya al-Islamiya, is an
alliance of approximately 20 brigades and battalions across Syria. An
estimated 37,000 fighters are affiliated with the SLF, making it the
largest coalition of rebels independent of the Free Syrian Army. Each of
the SLF’s subunits has its own name and operates independently; there
is no inherent strategic or tactical unity in the coalition. The most
powerful and well known of these brigades are the Suquor al-Sham
brigades and the Farouq battalions.
The
SLF’s leadership has largely been incorporated into the Supreme
Military Command, but the alliance remains more of a militant grouping
than a political entity. SLF-affiliated groups are considered to be
ideologically moderate Islamists, putting them at odds with some of the
extremist groups operating in the country. While the SLF maintains
brotherly relations with the FSA, it has criticized the FSA’s exiled
leadership for being too detached from the realities of the in-country
military conflict. The Saudi Arabian government has been the primary
supporter of the SLF, but Saudi Arabia agreed in April to channel all
future assistance through the SMC.
The Syrian Islamic Front
The
Syrian Islamic Front, or SIF, also known as Jabhat al-Islamiya
al-Tahrir al-Souriya, is an alliance of approximately 11 brigades and
battalions across Syria, most notably the Ahrar al-Sham brigades. An
estimated 13,000 fighters are affiliated with the SIF. SIF-affiliates
are viewed as conservative Salafists, who are more religiously motivated
than the Free Syrian Army or the Syrian Liberation Front. Most
SIF-affiliated groups, however, are considered to be Syrian nationalists
that don’t share the most extreme ideological elements of Al
Qaeda-affiliated groups such as support for a transnational Islamic
caliphate. The Syrian Islamic Front’s subunits each have their own name
and operate independently but are beginning to merge leadership and
forces, making it a more hierarchical and structured rebel coalition
than the SLF or the FSA.
The
Syrian Islamic Front’s leadership is not well incorporated into the
SMC, but it has ties within the leadership council and its subunits have
been cooperative with the SMC. The Syrian Islamic Front is largely
financed by wealthy individuals from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other
Gulf states.
The Nusra Front
The
Nusra Front, also known as Jabhat al-Nusra, is an Al Qaeda-affiliated
terrorist group, comprising approximately 6,000 foreign and domestic
fighters. The Nusra Front has reportedly been receiving significant
funding, arms, and training from Al-Qaeda and the Al Qaeda-affiliated
group, Islamic State of Iraq. Some of Nusra’s fighters are foreign
jihadists, many of whom are veterans of the Iraqi insurgency; it is
unclear, however, what percentage of the Nusra Front’s supporters are
foreign fighters as opposed to Syrian nationals. The Nusra Front is a
well-armed group that has claimed responsibility for multiple suicide
bombings and asymmetric attacks against Assad-regime targets. The Nusra
Front is also considered to be a fiercely sectarian Sunni group in
violent opposition to Syria’s Alawite community—an ethnoreligious group
of Shiite Muslims who comprise 12 percent of the Syrian population and
the majority of the Assad regime.
The
Nusra Front has a mixed relationship with other elements of the Syrian
rebellion. Shared opposition to President Assad and the effectiveness of
Nusra Front fighters have led to some cooperation between the Nusra
Front and other rebel battalions, including the SLF’s Deir ez-Zour
Revolutionary Council and the Syrian Islamic Front’s Ahrar al- Sham.
Opposition to the Nusra Front’s extremist ideology and the influence of
foreign fighters within the group, however, has led to direct
confrontation between the Nusra Front and other rebel groups throughout
Syria. Leaders of the FSA and the SLF have sought to publicly distance
themselves from the Nusra Front following its open pledge of allegiance
to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Kurdish groups
Kurds
are an ethnic group representing 9 percent of Syria’s ethnically
diverse population and are concentrated in the country’s north and
northeast regions. Until recently, most Kurds had not taken sides in the
rebellion, but the expansion of indiscriminate violence by the Assad
regime against population centers and the prospect of greater autonomy
for Kurdish regions in Syria have led to an increase in Kurdish support
for the rebellion. While Kurdish militias still prioritize the
independence and protection of their communities over a nationalist or
revolutionary agenda, their role in the conflict may grow. As of late
March, the Kurdish People’s Defense Units, often referred to as the YPG,
has agreed to share control of a district in northern Aleppo with other
rebel groups. Additionally, some Kurdish fighters have been
incorporated into the SLF, the Tawhid Brigade, and the Suquor al-Kurd
Brigade. There have been reports of clashes earlier this year between
Nusra Front battalions and Kurdish groups in the north, leading to
criticism of the Nusra Front by fellow rebel groups for wasting precious
resources that could otherwise be used in the fight to remove President
Assad.
Independent groups
There
are also roughly nine brigade alliances that operate independently of
the Free Syrian Army, the Syrian Liberation Front, or the Syrian Islamic
Front. Some of them have been incorporated into the SMC structure,
while others, particularly fringe extremist groups, remain independent.
The largest of these independent brigades is the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigade.
Its leadership is incorporated into the SMC and it coordinates with the
SLF. It is composed of an estimated 15,000 fighters and has been funded
by the Qatari government. Other notable independent groups with
leadership incorporated into the SMC are the Syrian Martyrs Brigade, the
Fajr al-Islam Battalion, and the Al-Haqq Brigade.
Multiple funding streams
Support
for Syrian opposition groups, particularly the armed portion of the
rebellion, comes from a variety of sources, including national
governments, wealthy individuals, and nongovernmental organizations. For
the majority of the rebellion, financial and materiel support was
delivered to Syrian opposition groups through ad hoc or informal
channels, which created an uneven set of capabilities for armed groups
and a disproportionate amount of influence by the most ideologically
extreme groups. The expansion of the war, however, and the increasing,
though limited, cohesion of the Syrian opposition has created a more
formal process of support for the rebellion and has placed an emphasis
on foreign-government aid. The core group of foreign-government
supporters—including the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and
the United Arab Emirates—have pledged to direct all military aid and
assistance through the SMC, allowing the coordinating body to direct
funds as necessary to rebel alliances and brigades, a process the Center
for American Progress has advocated for since August 2012.
Still,
it is unclear whether this international pledge to use the formal SMC
process will have the intended effect of forming a more cohesive Syrian
opposition and strengthening the more moderate elements of the
rebellion. The formal assistance processes are in their nascent stages,
which have led to the inefficient dispersal of aid and supplies to the
areas in need. Furthermore, many rebel groups, even those who are
closely linked to the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the SMC, still
receive much of their funding from informal channels and ideologically
motivated supporters. Finally, in order for the formal process of
assistance to work, Western and Arab governments will need to adhere to
their pledges and maximize the amount of support delivered through the
SMC, thus giving it the financial leverage it needs to coerce greater
unity from the different rebel groups in Syria.
But
several of the most important foreign-government funders of the
opposition support specific factions within the rebellion, with Qatar,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates each backing
different political and armed groups. Even the United States has
supported rebel groups without going through the formal SMC process, as
seen most clearly in U.S. training for Syrian rebel groups operating
along the Jordanian border. The competition for limited resources within
the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the SMC— exacerbated by informal
funding streams and factionalism—poses the most immediate risk to the
effort to create a cohesive, national Syrian opposition that could
immediately step in and fill the ensuing security vacuum if and when the
Assad regime falls.
Effect on U.S. policy options
Though
the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Supreme Joint Military Command
have made some progress turning the Syrian rebellion from a disorganized
series of armed groups and political actors into a united opposition
force, their efforts remain far short of what is needed to establish a
single, coherent voice and strategy for a post-Assad Syria. The current
limitations of opposition coordination complicate existing U.S. policy
options and demand greater planning for several potential contingencies
stemming from the lack of a cohesive national opposition. As the Center
for American Progress has stated on multiple occasions, increased
materiel support and lethal aid to the rebels should be contingent on
better organization by the opposition in order to limit the potential
for a proliferation of weapons. Without a stronger mechanism by the SMC
to distribute supplies and arms, it is unlikely that directly arming the
opposition will contribute significantly to the anti-Assad effort. But
failing to provide the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the SMC with any
financial and materiel support will eliminate what little leverage they
currently possess over the transition efforts.
Additionally,
the internal divisions and lack of an effective national strategy by
the Syrian opposition reduce the likelihood that the rebels will be able
to contribute to several critical postconflict priorities. In
particular, the prospects of securing Syria’s chemical-weapons
stockpile, eliminating the space for terrorist groups to operate,
safeguarding the country against collapse into sectarian violence, and
leading the country through on effective and stable political transition
are tenuous at best based on current levels of rebel organization. The
United States and the international community will need to think
carefully about how to address each potential contingency without being
able to count on a unified Syrian opposition to shoulder the burden.
The
central question for U.S. policymakers now becomes whether enough
progress has been made and enough potential remains to establish a truly
unified Syrian opposition. If the answer is yes, then a redoubling of
efforts must be made to bolster the international and domestic
legitimacy of the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the SMC. This includes
ensuring that all international supporters of the opposition adhere to
their commitment to deliver all funding, supplies, and arms through
these formal channels.
If
the answer is no, then policymakers should begin determining how best
to pursue U.S. goals and priorities working through channels independent
from the formal opposition. This may include independent action to
secure or destroy chemical-weapons stockpiles, funding and training
individual brigades for specific tasks such as maintaining a refugee
camp on the border with Jordan, or reaching out to more moderate members
of the current regime, who could help maintain order and security if
and when President Assad is removed from power.
Understanding
the capabilities and limitations of the Syrian opposition is crucial to
assessing the situation in Syria and what options exist. Before any
decisions are made, U.S. policymakers should consider whether the
opposition has the capability to effectively and peacefully step in and
assume control in a post-Assad Syria. Without factoring in the structure
and organization of the Syrian opposition, there are simply no options
on the table for U.S. policymakers.
Ken
Sofer is a Research Associate with the National Security and
International Policy team at the Center for American Progress. Juliana
Shafroth is an Intern with the National Security team at the Center.
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