Reconstruction of a classic Greek hoplite phalanx
(Unless otherwise indicated, all illustrations are from Wikipedia)
Today in Military History: July 6, 371 BC
We
go back to ancient Greece (or Hellas as the natives called it) for a
battle which effectively broke the Spartan hegemony over the entire
peninsula. It involved an innovative strategy which showed that the
Spartans could be beaten, and beaten badly.
Background
Since
the end of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), the Spartans had
established themselves as the dominant force in the entire Greek
peninsula. Prior to the war, the Spartans were considered one of the
preeminent land force in Greece, while their rival city-state Athens was
the leading naval power in the land. After the inevitable
confrontation, the Spartans learned to fight on the sea and beat the
Athenians and their allies at their own game. Athens lost all her
overseas colonies, most of its navy was disbanded, its city walls were
demolished, and the Delian League which Athens had created was
disbanded.
For the next three decade, the Spartans effectively
ruled over Greece. However, in 378 a new confederation of maritime
states – including Athens – banded together to oppose the Spartan
hegemony. In addition, the people of Thebes revolted against the
Spartan-backed government and ejected the Spartan garrison. Immediately
afterward, the Thebans began to organize a confederacy of their own. Led
by the statesman and general Epaminondas, a Boeotian (pronounced
bee-OO-shen) league was formed, which followed the Theban lead in all
things political and military.
Idealized statue of Epiminondas,
Stowe House, Buckinghamshire, England
The
Spartans launched a retaliatory attack against the Boeotians, but the
war dragged on without any real resolution until early 371. A peace
conference was arranged to occur in Sparta. The terms were generally
agreed to by both sides. However, Epaminondas provoked Spartan anger by
first signing the treaty in the name of just the city of Thebes. The
next day he asked the permission of the Spartans to instead sign on
behalf of the entire Boeotian confederacy. The Spartan king refused,
saying that each city should sign on its own to represent its
independence. Epaminondas replied that if that were so, then the other
cities of Laconia (the area of Greece south of the Isthmus of Corinth
directly controlled by Sparta) should be allowed to sign for themselves,
and not allow Sparta to sign for them. Angered, the Spartan co-ruler
Agesilaus struck the Thebans' name from the treaty; both sides then left
the conference and prepared for renewed hostilities.
Rather than
take the expected, easy route into Boeotia, the Spartans marched over
the rough hills and took the fortress of Creusis (along with twelve
Theban warships) before the Thebans were aware of their presence. It was
here that the Peloponnesian army led by the Spartans –and their
co-ruler Cleombratus – was confronted by a Boeotian levy led by Thebes.
Initially the six Boeotian generals (i.e. the Boeotarchs) present were
divided as to whether to offer battle, with Epaminondas being the main
advocate in favor of battle. Only when a seventh arrived who sided with
Epaminondas was the decision made. In spite of inferior numbers and the
doubtful loyalty of his Boeotian allies, Epaminondas and his Theban
warriors would offer battle on the plain before the town of Leuctra,
located near the larger town of Thespiae.
Ancient Hoplite Warfare
The Greek
poleis
(city-states) of this era used a system of warfare that can be traced
to at least 650 BC, perhaps slightly further back to the eighth century
BC. In most of the cities of Hellas, military duty was required of all
citizens (Athens had a cutoff of age 60) for short periods of time. This
included some drill and, of course, when war threatened the citizens
were called to arms. The major exception to this was Sparta, the leading
city of Laconia (from which the Spartans Greek name of Lacedaemon, or
in Greek
Λάκεδαίμον, was derived). Military service to the
Spartan state was mandatory and began at birth. The Spartans dominated
the southernmost portion of Hellas for centuries.
4th century BC Greek hoplite, wielding a dory (spear)
Hoplites were the heavy-armed and -armored soldiers of the individual
polis.
The word "hoplite" is likely derived from "hoplon," the shield which
each soldier carried. It was large (3.1 foot), hemispherical
wood-and-bronze shield. It functioned as both defensive protection and
as an offensive weapon (I will explain the latter function in a bit).
Depending
on the financial circumstances of the individual, the hoplite might
wear body armor as simple as layers of linen – possibly reinforced by
bronze plates – or the more elaborate "muscle" bronze breastplate, with
armor to protect the lower legs (greaves), and a helmet for the head.
There were various forms of helmets used. One of the most popular was
the Corinthian helmet (see below), which provided good protection for
the head and face. Its one major drawback was that hearing was badly
impaired.
Corinthian helmet, early fifth century BC
(From State Collection of Antiques Museum, Munich, Germany)
Each
Greek army had a simple formation: the phalanx, a large block of
infantry. Each city's hoplites would line up in long lines, with a depth
of between 8-12 men deep. In most formations, the most experienced or
elite soldiers would be placed in the right side of the formation, which
was considered a place of honor. Also, there was a practical reason for
these experienced troops' placement. Hoplites carried their shields on
their left shoulders. During their forward advance in battle, the
soldier to their left would tend to drift to the right to use the shield
of their neighbor for protection. As a result, the entire formation
involuntarily began a slight rightward shift. Therefore, elite hoplites
from one
polis or another was placed on the right side of the line to suppress this drift.
![Typical shield (hoplon) of 6th-3rd century BC, modern reconstruction. Note the capital L [lambda], representing Sparta (Image courtesy of www.larp.com)](http://burnpit.us/sites/default/files/leuctra04.jpg "Typical shield (hoplon) of 6th-3rd century BC, modern reconstruction. Note the capital L [lambda], representing Sparta (Image courtesy of www.larp.com)")
Typical shield (hoplon) of 6th-3rd century BC, modern reconstruction
Note the capital L [lambda], representing Sparta
(Image courtesy of www.larp.com)
Each
army approached its opponent at a walk, or a slow run at best. Once
opposing armies made contact, the attack could be compared to a rugby
scrum, with each "player" armed with a spear. In order for each force to
keep contact, ranks behind the front would begin pushing with their
hoplon against the back of the man to his front. Once a hoplite's spear
became useless, he usually wielded a secondary weapon, usually a
shortsword. When one or the other flank of an army broke and ran, the
battle was usually over.
Most Greek armies also had contingents of
other troop types. Usually small contingents of peltasts were present;
these were light-armed javelineers, slingers, or possible bowmen who
acted as skirmishers to disrupt the enemy's formations. [Many ancient
historians often did not even report the presence of peltasts in a Greek
army, faithfully reporting the number of hoplites but ignoring the
others.] Finally, small cavalry units were sometimes present, usually to
guard the flanks of the phalanx, or to pursue a routed enemy. Seldom
did either the peltasts or cavalry play a major role in a particular
battle. [There is a battle recorded in 391 BC where a force composed
entirely of peltasts defeated a Spartan regiment, killing 250 of the 600
Spartans.]
Typical Greek peltast, with 3 javelins & shield
Preparations for Battle
The
Spartan led army has been estimated by modern historians to be about
10,000–11,000 strong, with a contingent of about 800 peltasts and 1000
cavalry. The historian Xenophon (he of the famous work named
Anabasis
– look it up!) stated that the Spartan horsemen were basically raw
recruits unused to fighting on horseback. Cleombratus arranged his
hoplites in their usual fashion, with his line in a slight crescent
shape, with the Spartans (including his 300-strong personal bodyguard,
called the
hippeis) in the right side of the line. Spartan
soldiers comprised the majority of the right wing of the army, while
allied troops made up the rest of the line. Small groups of his cavalry
were deployed in front of the infantry – a bit out-of-the-ordinary – and
the peltasts were stationed initially on the left flank of the army.
[Spartan
hoplites could be easily discerned in any Greek army. First, each man
wore a dark red tunic under his armor and a red cloak. This was supposed
to keep an enemy from seeing that he had inflicted a wound on his
Spartan enemy. Also, each Spartan hoplite carried a
hoplon with
a large Greek capital letter "L" (lambda) on its face (see the
illustration above). Histories claim that when a Spartan became a man
and eligible for inclusion in the Spartan army, the final act of the
ceremony was when his mother handed him his
hoplon, which she
herself had constructed. She then gave him the instruction, "Return with
your shield or upon it." It was considered an act of cowardice for a
Spartan soldier to throw away his shield to escape a rout.]
The
Boeotian force is thought to have comprised approximately 6,000-7,000
soldiers. There were perhaps 1500 cavalry, and a similar number of
peltasts. Knowing that his army was badly outnumbered, Epimanondas made
some important decisions that are today still regarded as evolutionary
changes in military theory.
First, Epimanondas placed his more
numerous cavalry in place directly oppose the Spartan horsemen. Next,
the Theban boeotarch did two revolutionary things. He placed his best
troops, his native Thebans, in the LEFT flank of the Boeotian line, to
directly oppose the Spartans. Then, he lined his Thebans up with 50
ranks of hoplites, rather than the usual 8-12 ranks. He hoped to achieve
a quick knockout blow on the best hoplites in Hellas. Further, he
placed the Thebans most elite troops, the Sacred Band, in the far left
portion of the Theban alignment. These men were given the special
assignment of finding and killing the Spartan general.
Epimanondas's
final order was to the commanders of his allied soldiers in the rest of
the hoplite line. With so many of the Thebans gathered in the left
flank, the Theban center and right were under-strength. He directed
these two divisions to deploy slightly to the rear of the Theban left
(see the second map below) and of each other. He instructed the other
leaders to hold their place in line until the Thebans had contacted the
Spartans. In fact, he further told them, if the Spartan army got too
close to them, the Boeotian allies should slowly fall back. Then, once
the Spartans had been broken, the Boeotians should advance to the
attack.
Battle of Leuctra
Battle of Leuctra, First Phase (Red is the Spartans, Blue is Thebans)
(Map courtesy of www.emersonkent.com and the Department of History, U.S. Military Academy)
The
opening move of the battle took place when the Spartan peltasts move up
from their flank position and showered missiles on a group of Boeotian
camp followers who were trying to leave the battlefield. The result was
that many of these camp followers grabbed any weapon they could and
joined the Boeotian peltasts clustered in front of the Theban battle
line. Next, the Theban cavalry attacked the Spartan horsemen, very
quickly gaining the upper hand. As a result, the Spartan cavalry were
pushed back through their own phalanx, particularly disrupting the
Spartan left flank. Seeing the confusion of the Spartan phalanx,
Epimanondas ordered his left to advance on the Spartans.
At this
point in the battle, most of the peltasts on each side probably let
loose a last shower of missiles and retired behind their respective
armies. As the Theban left began drawing closer at a run – rather than
the usual walk – King Cleombratus saw the different alignment of the
enemy line. Realizing the danger to his own position, he frantically
sent orders to nearby divisions for reinforcements to meet the
left-handed haymakers of Theban hoplites targeting his flank unit. The
balance of the Spartan force continued its forward advance. Too late,
the Theban hoplites slammed into the Spartans, and the scrum of battle
began.
The noise of battle engulfed every man; the clash of metal
on metal, the stabbing of the spears, the irresistible pressure of the
shield of the man behind you pushing you forward, here a spear piercing a
man's throat, there a shield rim impacting the chin of his enemy, the
shouting of orders, the screams of dying men. It was a controlled chaos
unlike anything these men would know.
Battle of Leuctra, Second Phase
(Map courtesy of www.emersonkent.com and the Department of History, U.S. Military Academy)
The
numerical superiority of the Thebans quickly began to grind down the
Spartan bodyguards. Seeing an opening, the Sacred Band's commander
Pelopides ordered his soldiers forward to attack the Spartan general
Cleombratus. After several minutes of fierce fighting, the Spartan king
lay dead. Despite the forward momentum of the Thebans, the Spartan
hippeis fought a desperate battle to recover the body of their deceased
leader, finally succeeding. Once that occurred, the Spartan right
crumbled. Seeing that, the Boeotian center and right began a quick
movement forward. At about the same time, the remainder of the Spartan
army – comprising mostly allied troops – began to lose heart. Shortly
after, just as the Boeotian right was prepared to impact the Spartan
left, the entire Spartan army crumbled and routed back to their
fortified camp. After no more than two hours, the battle of Leuctra was
over.
Battle of Leuctra: Final Phase
(Map courtesy of www.emersonkent.com and the Department of History, U.S. Military Academy)
Aftermath
Shortly
after reaching their camp, the Spartans sent a herald to the Theban
camp, asking for a truce to recover the dead. Epimanondas agreed, but he
made one stipulation: the Spartan allies would be allowed to recover
and bury their dead first, then the Spartans. This was done to keep the
Spartans from covering up (pun intended) the number of their dead. The
Spartan army lost at least 1000 men dead according to Xenophon (another
historian claimed 4000+), while the Theban-Boeotian force lost about 300
men.
του Παντελή Καρύκα
Νομοσχέδιο
– κόλαφος για την Τουρκία από τις ΗΠΑ. «Προστατέψτε τους χριστιανικούς
πληθυσμούς, επιστρέψτε τις περιουσίες τους σε Τουρκία και κατεχόμενη
Κύπρο».
