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από anixneuseis
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In April 2015, Carnegie Europe published an article that
analyzed the global footprint of the EU. Looking at the period of the
second European Commission of former president José Manuel Barroso,
which ran from February 2010 to October 2014, the article examined how
the union deployed different foreign policy instruments across the
world. Now, at the beginning of a new institutional cycle, this article
examines developments during the commission of Jean-Claude Juncker, who
was president from November 2014 to November 2019.
As
in 2015, the present analysis combines traditional tools of EU
diplomacy and various forms of operational engagement (see figure 1).
Diplomacy includes visits by the EU’s top leaders, declarations by the
union’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, and
conclusions of the European Council and the Council of Ministers.
Engagement comprises sanctions, civilian and military operations, EU
assistance, and trade. The article also looks at the sizes of the
union’s overseas delegations and the deployment of EU special
representatives.1
These
indicators cover only a small part of the EU’s international
activities. Multilateral diplomacy, for instance, forms a large part of
the union’s external action but cannot be easily quantified. The article
does not deal with the many types of structured dialogue that the EU
entertains with countries across the world or with its diverse
non-trade-related economic activities. The development of other EU
instruments, such as recent initiatives to strengthen military
cooperation and crisis-response capacity or the 2016 global strategy, go
beyond the scope of this study. Still, this analysis offers a clear
indication of which countries were the focus of the EU’s attention and
where the union engaged operationally.
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN EU FOREIGN POLICY
The
EU’s foreign policy agenda has changed considerably over the past ten
years. At the time of the second Barroso commission, the focus was
clearly on the Arab Spring uprisings that began in late 2010, Russia’s
2014 annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas
region, relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and Iran’s nuclear program.
The Juncker commission also had to deal with many of these topics, but
it faced a broader agenda arising from the disruptive policies of the
administration of U.S. President Donald Trump and the need to respond to
the rise of China. The massive flows of refugees and migrants that
peaked in 2015–2016 became another dominant subject of EU external
policy.
There
were important institutional differences, too. In 2010–2014, much time
and energy was absorbed by implementing the foreign policy reforms of
the EU’s 2009 Lisbon Treaty, which established the EU’s current legal
framework. In particular, the treaty set up the European External Action
Service (EEAS), the union’s foreign policy arm. By 2014–2019, then EU
high representative for foreign affairs and security policy Federica
Mogherini had more opportunities to spend time outside Brussels.
The
rising dominance of the European Council, which brings together EU
heads of state and government, in the field of foreign policy became
more apparent under the 2014–2019 presidency of Donald Tusk. He showed a
greater interest in international developments than had his
predecessor, former European Council president Herman van Rompuy. This
shift limited the capacity for initiatives from the high representative
and the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council, which gathers national foreign
ministers.
The
cohesion of the EU member states suffered, particularly in 2014–2019,
from the divisions and mistrust left by the financial and migration
crises. It became increasingly difficult to achieve the unanimity needed
to make decisions on foreign policy. And the UK’s 2016 referendum to
leave the EU amounted to a severe setback that weakened the union’s
position both regionally and globally.
Despite
these differences, the two periods also show a good deal of continuity.
The overall level of international engagement remained roughly the
same. The number of visits of the EU’s top leaders declined, as did the
number of declarations by the high representative. By contrast, the
European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council adopted significantly
more conclusions on foreign affairs. The number of countries under EU
sanctions stayed about the same. Financial assistance and the sizes of
EU delegations increased moderately.
In
marked contrast to the emphasis on enhancing military cooperation in
the EU’s work in 2014–2019, the union launched only three new operations
in this period, and the overall number of deployed military and police
personnel declined. Trade policy was more dynamic, with the adoption of
six new trade agreements and the start of a number of new trade talks.
Altogether, while external policy went through interesting conceptual
innovations between 2014 and 2019, the data do not indicate significant
progress in operational terms.
Just
as in 2010–2014, EU trade policy emerged as the only instrument with a
truly global reach in 2014–2019. Assistance and sanctions again covered
all regions of the world, but with a clear emphasis on neighboring
regions and sub-Saharan Africa. (Unless otherwise stated, “neighboring
regions” in this article include countries in the EU’s Eastern and
Southern neighborhoods, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Russia,
Switzerland, Turkey, and the Western Balkans.) This regional focus was
even more evident in all the other instruments analyzed.
However,
all indicators measuring the EU’s attention to foreign policy topics—in
particular, travel by top officials, declarations by the high
representative, and council conclusions—reveal a relative decline in the
emphasis on neighboring regions (see figure 2). Instead, the union paid
more attention to sub-Saharan Africa and Central and South America.
The
authors’ telephone conversations with practitioners in March 2020
indicated three main explanations for this shift from a regional to a
global orientation.
First,
the conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, and Libya all erupted during the
second Barroso commission. EU institutions and officials initially
followed the unfolding drama on a daily basis and tried—not very
successfully—to contribute to political solutions. By the time of the
Juncker commission, these three conflicts had turned into permanent
crises. They still received significant attention, but much less than
before, leaving more space for issues beyond the EU’s neighborhood.
Second,
Mogherini had a more global outlook than her predecessor, Catherine
Ashton. Mogherini traveled more widely and engaged with regions that had
hardly been on the EU’s radar. This found expression in the high
representative’s declarations and in council conclusions.
Third,
the prominence of the migration challenge in recent years explains the
union’s increased attention on Africa. The numbers of visits,
declarations, and conclusions, as well as the level of EU assistance to
the continent, rose significantly.
VISITS OF THE EU’S TOP OFFICIALS
The
top institutional actors of EU external policy are the president of the
European Commission, the president of the European Council, and the EU
high representative for foreign affairs and security policy. They
interact with their international counterparts in different ways: over
the phone, by receiving visitors and convening conferences in Brussels,
and by visiting foreign capitals. As they are busy people and
international travel is costly and time consuming, their trips are a
useful indicator of the priorities of EU foreign policy.
The
total number of visits by Juncker, Tusk, and Mogherini in 2014–2019,
which includes their participation in multilateral summits, fell
slightly on 2010–2014 (see figure 3). This is mainly because Juncker—in
stark contrast to his predecessor, Barroso—traveled very little beyond
the EU’s borders.
As
in the earlier period, the data confirm the EU’s strong relationship
with the United States, with forty-one visits—although this number
includes trips to the UN headquarters in New York. Japan was the second
most visited country, probably because of negotiations on the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement.
Russia, which was in second place in the previous period, saw a
radical decrease in its number of visits—down to two from eighteen in
2010–2014. This fall is due to the EU’s sanctions against Russia following
the Ukraine crisis that began in late 2013. By contrast, the EU
leaders’ eleven visits to Ukraine testify to the union’s strong
engagement to help this country.
Turkey,
a crucial and difficult counterpart on both the Syria crisis and
migration issues, was visited thirteen times. Egypt remained the most
visited country in North Africa, but with significantly fewer trips
after President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power in June 2014: ten in
2014–2019 compared with seventeen in 2010–2014. A similar pattern can be
observed with Israel and Palestine, which together were visited only
six times, as opposed to twenty in the preceding period. This reflects a
tense relationship between the EU institutions and Israel and the
continuing deadlock in the Middle East peace process. In the Western
Balkans, EU visits remained frequent, with Serbia, Kosovo, and North
Macedonia the preferred destinations.
In
terms of regional distribution, travel to countries in the EU’s
neighborhood accounted for 44 percent of total travel—a reduction from
over half in 2010–2014. Asia was the second most popular destination
region, representing almost 20 percent of total visits, but with fewer
trips than in the previous period. By contrast, EU officials traveled
more often to sub-Saharan Africa (twenty-five visits) and to Canada
(eight).
DECLARATIONS OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE
During
Ashton’s tenure, declarations of the high representative were the EU’s
preferred way to communicate about international developments. Ashton’s
successor, Mogherini, also used this instrument frequently—917 times—but
significantly less often. That reflects a greater engagement not only
with the mainstream media but also with social media, particularly
Twitter and Facebook. For this study, the authors analyzed declarations
of the high representative from November 2014 to November 2019 and
statements from EEAS spokespeople and press releases that contained
quotes by the high representative.
Declarations
can have great political importance when they define the EU’s initial
response to an emerging crisis or unexpected development, but many
simply rehash established EU positions. Three-quarters of Mogherini’s
declarations referred to developments in specific countries, while
one-fourth cited international negotiations or conferences or annual
recurrences, such as Human Rights Day or International Anticorruption
Day.
The
high representative adopts declarations on their own authority, but
they have to be careful to remain in the framework of the EU’s consensus
on each issue. The radical decline in the number of declarations on
Syria and Libya compared with the previous period probably reflects the
fact that these topics were controversial among EU member states.
Despite
this decrease, Syria, the Middle East peace process, Turkey, Ukraine,
and Libya continued to be among the most recurrent topics in the high
representative’s declarations. But a comparison with the earlier period
indicates that the EU’s focus gradually shifted away from these regions
(see Figure 4). Venezuela was mentioned the second most often in
2014–2019, with overall references to the Americas up to 12 percent of
the total from 4 percent in the previous period. Declarations on
sub-Saharan African countries increased from 14 percent to 22 percent.
Developments in Asia accounted for 12 percent, a share similar to that
recorded during Ashton’s tenure.
Altogether,
references to events in the EU’s neighboring regions amounted to only
40 percent of all high representative declarations in 2014–2019, against
more than 55 percent in 2010–2014.
CONCLUSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL
Like
the declarations of the high representative, the conclusions of the
European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council reflect the EU’s
positions on international events. The main difference lies in the fact
that conclusions are negotiated among all member states, usually in a
complicated process that involves several layers of preparatory bodies.
As they represent the collective views of the EU members, conclusions
have greater political weight than declarations. For this study, the
authors tracked the numbers of references to non-EU countries in the
conclusions of meetings of the European Council and of the Foreign
Affairs Council from November 2014 to November 2019.
In
the EU’s current legal framework, established in 2009 by the Lisbon
Treaty, the European Council is the union’s top foreign policy body.
During the Juncker commission, it met twenty-one times. EU foreign
ministers normally come together as the Foreign Affairs Council once a
month, although other meetings are held if the situation requires it. In
2014–2019, the council met seventy-four times.
The
conclusions of the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council
contained 463 references to non-EU countries in 2014–2019. This was a
significant increase on the previous period, when 279 references were
recorded, which is quite surprising given that the number of meetings
remained roughly the same. One explanation might be that Mogherini, as
chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, was particularly averse to
controversial debates in the council and therefore put a large number of
more consensual topics on the agenda. The fact that in the preceding
period the European Council had less time for foreign policy, because it
focused almost exclusively on the financial crisis, could also have
played a role.
The
data show that migration, developments in Syria and Libya, and
terrorism in the Levant were among the top preoccupations of EU
governments, featuring eighty-seven times in total. The crisis in
Ukraine was mentioned twenty-six times (see figure 5). Overall, almost
45 percent of the conclusions concerned events in a neighboring region:
as with the high representative’s declarations, this marks a reduction
from 55 percent in 2010–2014.
Asia
and Latin America received considerably more attention from the EU than
in the earlier period, with Venezuela (twelve mentions) and North Korea
(eleven) particularly in the spotlight. References to sub-Saharan
African states also increased significantly, accounting for 20 percent
of the total.
The
conclusions show the emergence of new issues, too. Brexit was one of
the most frequently mentioned topics after the 2016 UK referendum, as
was climate change before and after the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change’s 2016 Paris Agreement to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions.
INSTRUMENTS OF DIRECT ENGAGEMENT
Important
types of direct engagement by the EU include sanctions, civilian and
military operations, the deployment of special representatives,
development assistance, and trade.
SANCTIONS
Sanctions
have become the EU’s primary hard-power instrument, even though they
have an uneven record of effectiveness in changing the behavior of the
targeted state. Most frequently, the EU adopts arms embargoes against
states involved in military conflicts and imposes visa bans and asset
freezes on governments responsible for human rights violations. In a few
instances, such as with Iran, Russia, and Syria, the EU has established
comprehensive sanctions regimes that also target the financial and
energy sectors. In past years, the EU’s sanctions policies have been
closely coordinated with those of the United States. This cooperation
has diminished during the Trump administration.
As
of January 2020, thirty-three states were subject to some kind of EU
sanctions, as opposed to thirty at the end of the union’s previous
institutional cycle in 2014. During the term of the Juncker Commission
new sanctions were imposed on Burundi, Mali, Nicaragua, Turkey,
Venezuela, and Yemen. Sanctions against Eritrea, Ivory Coast, and
Liberia were lifted.
In
geographic terms, sanctions clearly represent an area where EU action
has global reach. However, here too, there is an emphasis on sub-Saharan
Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and the Western Balkans.
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OPERATIONS
Since the European Security and Defense Policy became operational in 2002, the EU has undertaken thirty-five civilian and military missions. Most of them have been relatively small in scale and of limited ambition.
Growing
instability in the EU’s neighborhood has reignited the union’s interest
in military cooperation. Particularly under the Juncker commission, the
EU launched many initiatives to boost capabilities and enhance
cooperation in this area, with the aim of achieving strategic autonomy.
But considerable progress in the development of policy has not yet led
to the launch of more ambitious operations.
As of January 2020, seventeen missions were ongoing and approximately 5,000 personnel were deployed. Compared to 2015,
this is approximately the same number of missions, but the number of
deployed personnel decreased from 6,000 in 2015. While nine missions
were initiated under Ashton, only three started under Mogherini.
Of the seventeen missions active in January 2020, eleven were
civilian, mostly police and rule-of-law operations. Of the six military
missions, one—in Bosnia and Herzegovina—served peacekeeping purposes;
three—in the Central African Republic, Mali, and Somalia—were training
missions; and two were naval missions. The Somalia mission, Operation
Atalanta, aimed at combating piracy off the Horn of Africa, while the
naval mission Operation Sophia sought to identify, capture, and dispose
of vessels used by migrant smugglers or traffickers in the
Mediterranean.
The
distribution of these operations demonstrates the particular focus of
EU foreign and security policy on the neighborhood and Africa. Seventeen
of the thirty-five ongoing or completed operations have taken place in
African states, with most of the rest occurring in the Western Balkans,
Eastern Europe, or the Middle East.
EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES
The
appointment of EU special representatives is another tool of direct
engagement with certain regions or on certain policy priorities. The EU
has appointed sixteen special representatives since 1999 (see table).
Since 2009, they have been nominated by the European Council on a
proposal from the high representative.
There
is an ongoing debate between the EEAS and the member states about
whether EU special representatives should be seen as instruments
primarily of the high representative or of the member states. This
dispute is probably the reason why so few of them have been appointed in
recent years. By contrast, other major international actors, such as
the United States or the UN, have many such senior envoys.
The
distribution once again demonstrates a focus on Africa and the EU’s
neighborhood. Five of the sixteen special representatives have dealt
with Africa-related issues; six with countries in Eastern Europe and the
Western Balkans; and three with the Middle East.
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
The
EU, with its member states, is the world’s largest donor of development
assistance. Under the union’s 2014–2020 budget, the collective
development assistance spending of the EU institutions amounted to
approximately €14 billion ($15 billion) a year. This figure is projected
to increase in the 2021–2027 budget, which is under negotiation as of
this writing. The European Commission has proposed a 30 percent increase
in funding for EU external action, but many member states take a more restrictive approach.
In
2018, the latest year for which data are available, almost 40 percent
of total spending went to sub-Saharan Africa (see figure 6). This was
followed by the Middle East (26 percent) and the Western Balkans and
Eastern Europe (12 percent).
If
per capita spending is considered, and countries with extremely small
populations are ignored to avoid distorted results, the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Georgia had the
highest concentrations of EU assistance in 2018. Altogether, the level
of EU aid on a per capita basis is significantly higher for the union’s
neighboring regions than for other parts of the world.
TRADE AGREEMENTS
The EU is the world’s biggest trading power, accounting for approximately 17 percent of global trade in goods and services in 2018. External trade in goods and services represented
about 35 percent of the EU’s gross domestic product in 2018. Trade is
an area in which the EU speaks with one voice because the union’s Common
Commercial Policy empowers the commission to negotiate trade
agreements, monitor their implementation, and respond to unfair trade
practices. On trade, the EU is a genuine global actor: it either has
concluded or is planning to conclude trade agreements with most
countries of the world.
Trade
policy used to be a matter for technocrats but achieved a high
political profile during the years of the Juncker commission. First, the
proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU
and the United States and the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement ran into massive public protests. Then, the entry into force of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine was delayed when the Netherlands voted against it in a referendum in April 2016.
One
might have expected widespread public resistance to further trade
liberalization to dampen the EU’s appetite for new agreements. But
aggressive U.S. trade policies under the Trump administration, together
with a crisis of the multilateral trade system centered on the World
Trade Organization, prompted the EU to maintain its efforts to negotiate
trade agreements with countries and regions across the world. The
Juncker commission concluded six such accords, with Canada, Japan,
Mexico, Singapore, southern African countries, and Vietnam. Twelve new
trade negotiations were initiated during this time, the same number as
in the preceding period.
SIZE OF EU DELEGATIONS
As
of December 2019, the EU had 141 delegations around the world employing
5,799 staffers, including officials of the EEAS and the European
Commission and local agents. Before the Lisbon Treaty reforms, this
network essentially dealt with trade and development assistance. Since
2009, the EU delegations have expanded their role and are now the main
interlocutors between the union and the host states, including on
political matters. More recently, the EU has also sent military attachés
and antiterrorism experts to join the delegations.
The
political importance of the union’s relationship with a country is one
of the main factors behind the size of a delegation. Beijing and
Washington, for example, host large EU missions with close to 100
officials. By contrast, the deterioration of relations with Russia has
resulted in a reduction of the size of the EU delegation in Moscow by
almost a third.
A
second factor is the level of EU assistance to the host country. About
two-thirds of the staff in the delegations are commission officials,
most of whom work on assistance projects. Turkey—where political
importance and a huge assistance program come together—hosted in
December 2019 the largest EU delegation, with 175 staffers. That is a 25
percent increase on the level in December 2013, mainly because of the
massive expansion of assistance after the EU and Turkey reached a deal in March 2016 aimed at discouraging refugees from entering the EU.
Overall,
the geographic distribution of the delegations follows that of
development aid: 25 percent of EU staff abroad are deployed in
delegations in the union’s neighboring regions; 35 percent are in
sub-Saharan Africa.
Notable
changes in 2014–2019 included the doubling in size of the EU
delegations to Jordan and Lebanon in response to crises in the Middle
East and the steady growth of staff in sub-Saharan Africa.
CONCLUSION
Analysis
of the EU’s use of external policy instruments confirms that the union
is a global actor in some respects, such as trade policy, sanctions, and
assistance, but that it focuses its engagement mainly on neighboring
regions. This regional bias also applies to the indicators of the EU’s
attention to international developments: visits, declarations, and
council conclusions. Yet in recent years, the union has shown an
increased interest in sub-Saharan Africa and, to a more limited extent,
other parts of the world.
The
comparison between the second Barroso commission and the Juncker
commission indicates that the EU’s overall level of engagement with the
outside world has remained roughly the same. In general, the union’s
regional and global reach did not grow significantly between 2014 and
2019. At a time when Europe’s weight on the global scales was
diminishing and its neighborhood was troubled by multiple crises, the EU
and its member states were not able or willing to invest significantly
more in their common foreign policy.
The
new EU leadership team that came into office in November 2019
understands that the present state of EU external policy leaves room for
improvement. The leaders started with high ambitions: senior
politicians such as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen
and High Representative Josep Borrell declared that Europe would
finally learn the “language of power,” turn itself into a geopolitical actor,
and take the lead on critical policy issues such as climate, cyber, and
Africa. But as the new top officials were about to begin their work,
Europe was hit by the coronavirus pandemic, which is likely to be a game
changer for EU foreign policy.
Francesco Siccardi is a senior program manager at Carnegie Europe.
The authors are grateful to Emma Murphy, Nicola Paccamiccio, and Malte Peters for their research support.
NOTES
1 Data
for this article come from the European Commission, the European
External Action Service, and the EU Council General Secretariat.
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