October 28, 1940 , The Battle of Pindus
by Valtrex
Introduction
At 2:50 am on Sunday, 28 October 1940, General Ioannis Metaxas, Prime Minister of Greece , was awoken in his Athens home. At the door was the Italian Ambassador, Count Emmanuelle Grazzi, with a written ultimatum to the Greek government demanding that Italian forces be given free passage into Greece from Albania and that they be allowed to garrison certain unspecified "strategic points of Greek territory". Italy claimed that its request for this "temporary" occupation was the result of British attempts to involve more and
more countries in the war. If Greece refused to comply then resistance would be "broken by force of arms".
A reply was demanded by 6.00 am, but Metaxas gave it at once — "Alors c'est la guerre" (well, this means War, in French). At 5.30 am Italian troops crossed the Greek–Albanian border and Greece was at war with Fascist Italy.
The Italian Ultimatum:
"The Italian Government has repeatedly noted how, in the course of the present conflict, the Greek Government assumed & maintained an attidute which was contrary not only with that of formal, peaceful, good neighborly relations between two nations, but also with the precise duties which were incumbent on the Greek Government in view of its status as a neutral country. On various occasions the Italian Government has found it necessary to urge the Greek Government to observe these duties and to protest against their systematic violation, particularly serious since the Greek Government permitted its territorial water, its coasts and its ports to be used by the British fleet in the course of its war operations, aided in supplying the British air forces and permitted organization of a military information service in the Greek archipelago to Italy's damage.
The Greek Government was perfectly aware of these facts which several times formed the basis of diplomatic representations on the part of Italy to which the Greek Government, which should have taken consideration of the grave consequences of its attitude, failed to respond with any measure for the protection of its own neutrality, but, instead, intensified its activities favoring the British armed forces and its cooperaticn with Italy's enemies.
The Italian Government has proof that this co-operation was foreseen by the Greek Government and was regulated by understandings of a mllitary, naval and aeronautical character.
The Italian Government does not refer only to the British guarantee accepted by Greece as a part of the program of action against Italy's security but also to explicit, precise nengagements undertaken by the Greek Government to put at the disposal of powers at war with Italy important strategic positions on Greek territory, including air bases in Thessaly and Macedonia, designed for attack on Albanian territory.
In this connection the Italian Government must remind the Greek Government of the provocative activities carried out against the Albanian nation, together with the terroristic policy it has adopted toward the people of Ciamuria and the persistent efforts to create disorders beyond its frontiers.
For these reasons, also, the Italian Government has acceptedthe necessity, even though futilely, of calling the attention of the Greek Government to the inevitable consequences of its policy toward Italy. This no longer can be tolerated by Italy.
Greek neutrality has been tending continuously toward a mere shadow. Responsibility for this situation lies primarily on the shoulders of Great Britain and its aim to involve ever more countries in war.
But now it is obvious that the policy of the Greek Government has been and is directed toward transforming Greek territory, or, at least permitting Greek territory to be transformed, into a base for war operations against Italy.
This could only lead to armed conflict between Italy and Greece, which the Italian Government has every intention of avoiding.
The Italian Government, therefore, has reached the decision to ask the Greek Government, as a guaranty of Greek neutrality and as a guaranty of Italian security, for permission to occupy with its own armed forces several strategic points in Greek territory for the duration of the presert conflict with Great Britain.
The Italian Government asks the Greek Government not to oppose this occupation and not to obstruct the free passage of the troops carrying it out.
These troops do not come as enemies of the Greek people and the Italian Government does rot in any way intend that the temporary occupation of several strategic points, dictated by special necessities of a purely defensive character, should compromise Greek sovereignty and independence.
The Italian Government asks that the Greek Government give immediate orders to military authoritles that this occupation may take place in a peaceful manner. Wherever the Italian troops may meet resistance this resistance will be broken by armed force, and the Greek Government would have the responsibility for the resulting consequences"
Order of Battle
ITALY
The Army Group Albania was created under the command of General Ubaldo Soddu
It comprised the 9th Army/Armata (General Mario Vercellino), and the 11th Army/Armata (General Carlo Geloso):
Introduction
At 2:50 am on Sunday, 28 October 1940, General Ioannis Metaxas, Prime Minister of Greece , was awoken in his Athens home. At the door was the Italian Ambassador, Count Emmanuelle Grazzi, with a written ultimatum to the Greek government demanding that Italian forces be given free passage into Greece from Albania and that they be allowed to garrison certain unspecified "strategic points of Greek territory". Italy claimed that its request for this "temporary" occupation was the result of British attempts to involve more and
more countries in the war. If Greece refused to comply then resistance would be "broken by force of arms".
A reply was demanded by 6.00 am, but Metaxas gave it at once — "Alors c'est la guerre" (well, this means War, in French). At 5.30 am Italian troops crossed the Greek–Albanian border and Greece was at war with Fascist Italy.
The Italian Ultimatum:
"The Italian Government has repeatedly noted how, in the course of the present conflict, the Greek Government assumed & maintained an attidute which was contrary not only with that of formal, peaceful, good neighborly relations between two nations, but also with the precise duties which were incumbent on the Greek Government in view of its status as a neutral country. On various occasions the Italian Government has found it necessary to urge the Greek Government to observe these duties and to protest against their systematic violation, particularly serious since the Greek Government permitted its territorial water, its coasts and its ports to be used by the British fleet in the course of its war operations, aided in supplying the British air forces and permitted organization of a military information service in the Greek archipelago to Italy's damage.
The Greek Government was perfectly aware of these facts which several times formed the basis of diplomatic representations on the part of Italy to which the Greek Government, which should have taken consideration of the grave consequences of its attitude, failed to respond with any measure for the protection of its own neutrality, but, instead, intensified its activities favoring the British armed forces and its cooperaticn with Italy's enemies.
The Italian Government has proof that this co-operation was foreseen by the Greek Government and was regulated by understandings of a mllitary, naval and aeronautical character.
The Italian Government does not refer only to the British guarantee accepted by Greece as a part of the program of action against Italy's security but also to explicit, precise nengagements undertaken by the Greek Government to put at the disposal of powers at war with Italy important strategic positions on Greek territory, including air bases in Thessaly and Macedonia, designed for attack on Albanian territory.
In this connection the Italian Government must remind the Greek Government of the provocative activities carried out against the Albanian nation, together with the terroristic policy it has adopted toward the people of Ciamuria and the persistent efforts to create disorders beyond its frontiers.
For these reasons, also, the Italian Government has acceptedthe necessity, even though futilely, of calling the attention of the Greek Government to the inevitable consequences of its policy toward Italy. This no longer can be tolerated by Italy.
Greek neutrality has been tending continuously toward a mere shadow. Responsibility for this situation lies primarily on the shoulders of Great Britain and its aim to involve ever more countries in war.
But now it is obvious that the policy of the Greek Government has been and is directed toward transforming Greek territory, or, at least permitting Greek territory to be transformed, into a base for war operations against Italy.
This could only lead to armed conflict between Italy and Greece, which the Italian Government has every intention of avoiding.
The Italian Government, therefore, has reached the decision to ask the Greek Government, as a guaranty of Greek neutrality and as a guaranty of Italian security, for permission to occupy with its own armed forces several strategic points in Greek territory for the duration of the presert conflict with Great Britain.
The Italian Government asks the Greek Government not to oppose this occupation and not to obstruct the free passage of the troops carrying it out.
These troops do not come as enemies of the Greek people and the Italian Government does rot in any way intend that the temporary occupation of several strategic points, dictated by special necessities of a purely defensive character, should compromise Greek sovereignty and independence.
The Italian Government asks that the Greek Government give immediate orders to military authoritles that this occupation may take place in a peaceful manner. Wherever the Italian troops may meet resistance this resistance will be broken by armed force, and the Greek Government would have the responsibility for the resulting consequences"
Order of Battle
ITALY
The Army Group Albania was created under the command of General Ubaldo Soddu
It comprised the 9th Army/Armata (General Mario Vercellino), and the 11th Army/Armata (General Carlo Geloso):
- 9 ARMATA (General Mario Vercellino)
- IV Corps
-53rd Infantry Division "AREZZO"
- XIV Corps
-41st Infantry Division "FIRENZE"
- XVII Corps
-32nd Infantry Division "MARCHE"
-38th Infantry Division "PUGLIE"
- III Corps
-Infantry Division "FORLI"
-53rd Infantry Division "AREZZO"
-19th Infantry Division "VENEZIA"
-Infantry Division "PINEROLO"
-The "RICAGNO" Brigade
- XVI Corps
-49th Infantry Division "PARMA"
-3rd Alpini Division "JULIA"
- 11 ARMATA (General Carlo Geloso)
-51st Infantry Division "SIENA"
-131st Armored Division "CENTAURO"
-The Cavalry Division:
7th Cavalry Regiment
19th Cavalry Regiment
GREECE
Opposite the Italian forces, on the Albanian-Greek borderline, these units were deployed:
- -VIII Infantry Epirotan Division
It comprised 15 IB, 1 Reckon Platoon, 16 Arty Batteries, HQ/III Inf.Brigade (Col. Demetrios Yiatzes), 39th Evzone Regt.
- -TSDM (West Macedonia Army Section)
It comprised 22 IB, 2 Reckon Platoons, 22 Arty Batteries.
- -The Davakes Detachment
THE BATTLE OF PINDUS (OCTOBER 28th 1940-OCTOBER 30th 1940)
At 5:30 am, on October 28, 1940 , according to the Italian plan, the 3rd Alpini Division "JULIA" invaded Greece, towards the Greek town of Metsovon . The Italian objective was to cut off the Greek VIII Infantry Division from the rest of the Greek forces, in order to split the Greek units deployed in Epirus, W. Macedonia & Thessaly. The Pindus Sector (i.e. the central sector of the front) was vital for the Greek defence. The Pindus Mountain range, extending across Greece (150 Km/93 miles), contains high, steep peaks, dissected by many deep canyons and other karstic landscapes.The only Greek force deployed in the region, was the Pindus or Davakes' Detachment , named after its CO, Colonel Constantine Davakes
It comprised two out of the three Infantry Battalions of the 51st Infantry Regiment (I/51 IB, II/51 IB). The III/51 Battalion was moving to the front when the Italians invaded. The Detachment comprised also a mountain artillery battery (75 mm), a field artillery battery (65 mm) & a Cavalry troop. Its total force was 2,000 men. The Deachment's objectives were:
- -To secure its sector according to the Greek defence plan (code name: IBa plan).
- -To play the role of the liaison between the VIII Division & the TSDM (W. Macedonia Army Section).
- -To block the Pindus mountain paths that lead from E to W.
To fullfill its mission, Davakes divided its front into 3 sectors:
- -Left sector (one Infantry Battalion).
- -Central sector (one IB).
- -Right sector (one Infantry Coy, two MG Platoons, one Reckon Team, one Field Arty Battery, one Platoon out of the IX Division).
The Italians launched their assault at 5:30 am. The Alpini troops, attacked the three DD sectors, following five major directions, with platoon or company strength. This assault took place under heavy rain.
Against the right sector, the Alpini attacked with two companies, without any artillery support. Due to the fierce Greek resistance, this attack failed. During the night of October 28-29, the sector's Greek CO, organized a commando operation against the Italian troops stationed at the village of Grammos, which resulted to the capture of 11 Alpini troops & one Officer.
At the central sector, the situation was more dangerous. The Itallians advanced against the Greek entrenchments with the main force of the Division, with the support of Artillery guns & mortars. The Greeks fought obstinate; however at noon, they were forced to withdraw further to the S.
At the left sector, the Italians attacked with a force of two battalions. Despite their courageous efforts, they failed to overcome the Greeks covering this area.
During the first night (October 28th), though, the Italians managed to establish a bridgehead at the village of Kastaniani . The Greek HQ was worried about the new situation & ordered the I Infantry "THESSALY" Division (Maj. Gen. Vassilios Vrachnos) to move immediately with a 24-hour limit to the area. It also issued an order for the immediate strenghtening of the DD.
In the morning of October 29 , the Italians continued their attacks.
At the central sector, they managed after heavy fighting to capture the Muka top. The Greeks counter-attacked (with the III/51 Batallion that had just arrived to the area) & recaptured the top. Yet, within a few hours, the Greek defence line (central sector) was shaking. Davakes ordered immediately his troops to withdaw their forces to the second line of defence (Kato Arena-Gusteritsa).
At the left sector, in the evening of the same day, the Italians succeded in creating a gap between the defence forces (they surrounded an entire company). Davakes ordered his men to regroup towards Kerasovo .
During the night of October 29th , the Italians succeded in creating a gap at the central sector, they moved their forces towards the Greek VIII Division & they were threatening Metsovon .
In the morning of October 30th , Davakes decided to withdraw its entire force towards the Samarina-Koutsouro-Tsouka line. At 16:00 , elements of the I Infantry Division arrived at the area & its CO Maj. Gen. Vrachnos, took over the command
Maj.Gen. Vassilios Vrachnos (center) & his staff at Heptachorion, upon his arrival at the front, October 30, 1940
The front remained on stability until November 14th, when the Greek Counter-Offensive began. On November 14th, the total number of the Greeks mobilized, was 420,000 men.
Greek Cavalry man, 1940. He's armed with the Manlicher-Carcano M1938 Carbine & the M1887 Cavalry Sabre
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