Although
the Byzantines suffered many attacks, prolonged sieges, internal
rebellions, and even a period of occupation in the 13th century AD by
the crusaders in the Fourth Crusade, Constantinoples legendary defences
were the most formidable in both the ancient and medieval worlds. It
could not, though, resist the mighty cannons of the Ottoman Sultan
Mehmed II.
After
being sieged for several weeks, Constantinople, the jewel and bastion
of Christendom, was finally conquered, smashed, and looted on Tuesday,
May 29, 1453 ending the most renowned empire to have ever lived…the
Romans.
The Roman empire had lasted over 2,000 years and yet was brought to its knees, how then did they become so powerful?
SOLDIERS -
The
Eastern Roman army was a direct continuation of the Roman army, the
Eastern Roman Army was highly organised, showed a very good level of
discipline, they were well-versed in advanced tactics, strategic prowess
and organization. We must also Consider that the Byzantines lasted
almost 1000 years after their western counterparts, so technologies,
tactics and weaponry had all advanced, during this period, the nature
and type of armour worn by Byzantine soldiers had changed significantly.
The
Byzantine Army or Eastern Roman Army was the primary military body of
the Byzantine armed forces, serving alongside the Byzantine Navy. The
Army was among the most effective armies of western Eurasia for much of
the Middle Ages. Over time the cavalry arm became more prominent in the
Byzantine army as the legion system disappeared in the early 7th
century. Later reforms reflected some Germanic and Asian influences
–
rival forces frequently became sources of mercenary units e.g.; Huns,
Cumans, Alans and (following the Battle of Manzikert) Turks, meeting the
Empire's demand for light cavalry mercenaries. Since much of the
Byzantine military focused on the strategy and skill of generals
utilizing milita troops, heavy infantry were recruited from the best of
Byzantine Soldiers, Frankish troops and later Varangian mercenaries.
From
the seventh to the 12th centuries, the Byzantine army was among the
most powerful and effective military forces in the world – neither
Middle ages Europe nor (following its early successes) the fracturing
Caliphate could match the strategies and the efficiency of the Byzantine
army. Restricted to a largely defensive role in the 7th to mid-9th
centuries, the Byzantines developed the theme-system to counter the more
powerful Caliphate. From the mid-9th century, however, they gradually
went on the offensive, culminating in the great conquests of the 10th
century under a series of soldier-emperors such as Nikephoros II Phokas,
John Tzimiskes and Basil II . The army they led was less reliant on the
militia of the themes; it was by now a largely professional force, with
a strong and well-drilled infantry at its core and augmented by a
revived heavy cavalry arm. With one of the most powerful economies in
the world at the time, the Empire had the resources to put to the field a
powerful host when needed, in order to reclaim its long-lost
territories.
After
the collapse of the theme-system in the 11th century, the Byzantines
grew increasingly reliant on professional Tagmata troops, including
ever-increasing numbers of foreign mercenaries. The Komnenian emperors
made great efforts to re-establish a native army, instituting the
pronoia system of land grants in exchange for military service.
Nevertheless, mercenaries remained a staple feature of late Byzantine
armies since the loss of Asia Minor reduced the Empire's
recruiting-ground, while the abuse of the pronoia
grants led to a progressive feudalism in the Empire. The Komnenian
successes were undone by the subsequent Angeloi dynasty, leading to the
dissolution of the Empire at the hands of the Fourth Crusade in 1204.
The
Emperors of Nicea managed to form a small but effective force using the
same structure of light and heavily armed troops, both natives and
foreigners. It proved effective in defending what remained of Byzantine
Anatolia and reclaiming much of the Balkans and even Constantinople
itself in 1261. Another period of neglect of the military followed in
the reign of Andronikos II of Palaiologos, which allowed Anatolia to
fall prey to an emerging power, the Ottoman Emirate. Successive civil
wars in the 14th century further sapped the Empire's strength and
destroyed any remaining chance of recovery, while the weakening of
central authority and the devolution of power to provincial leaders
meant that the Byzantine army was now composed of a collection of
militias, personal entourages and mercenary detachments.
THE ARMY UNDER JUSTINIAN AND HIS SUCCESSORS -
The
army of Justinian I was the result of fifth-century reorganizations to
meet growing threats to the empire, the most serious from the expanding
Persian empire. Gone were the familiar Legions, cohorts and alae of old
Rome, and in their place were small infantry battalions or horse
regiments called an arithmos, tagma or numerus. A numerus had between
300 and 400 men and was commanded by a tribune. Two or more numeri formed a brigade, or moria; two or more brigades a division, or meros.
There were six classifications of troops:
- The guard troops stationed in the capitol.
- The comitatenses of the old Roman field armies. In Justinian's day these were more commonly called stratiotai. Regular soldiers of the Roman army, the stratiotai were chiefly recruited from subjects of the empire in the highlands of Thrace, Illyricum and Isauria.
- The limitanei. The least changed element of the Roman army, limitanei still performed their traditional duties of guarding frontiers and garrisoning border posts. Like how the comitatenses were called stratiotai in the heyday of the Justinians, the limitanei were known as akritai by the mainly Greek speaking subjects of the Eastern Empire. This terming of limitanei as akritai in Greek, led to folktales of the heroism of the limitanei/akritai, especially the popular tale of the hero Diogenes Akritas during the wars between the Byzantines and the various Arab Caliphates.
- The foederati. They were a relatively new element in the army, recruited from the fifth century onwards from barbarian volunteers. They were formed into cavalry units under Roman officers. A ban on enlistments by Roman subjects was lifted in the sixth century, and their composition became mixed.
- The Allies. These were bands of barbarians, Huns, Herules, Goths or others who were bound by treaty to provide the empire with military units commanded by their own chiefs, in return for land or yearly subsidy.
- The bucellarii. The private armed retainers of generals, Praetorian Prefects, officers of lesser rank and the rich, the bucellarii were often a significant portion of a field army's cavalry force. The size of a retinue of bucellarii depended on the wealth of the employer. Their rank and file were called hypaspistai, or shield-bearers, and their officers, doryphoroi or spear-bearers. Doryphoroi took solemn oaths of fidelity to their patron and of loyalty to the emperor. One of the most noted generals of the period, Belisarius, had been a doryphoros in Justinian's retinue before his becoming of emperor. The bucellarii were usually mounted troops, mostly Huns, Goths and mountaineers of Thrace or Asia Minor.
The
size of Justinian's army is unclear. Bury, writing in the 1920s,
accepted the estimate of 150,000 troops of all classes in 559 given by
Agathia of Myrina in his History. Modern scholars estimate the total
strength of the imperial army under Justinian to be between 300,000 and
350,000 soldiers.
Field
armies generally had 15,000 to 25,000 soldiers and were formed mainly
of comitatenses and foederati, reinforced by the commanders' retinues
and barbarian allies. The expeditionary force of Belisarius during his
reconquest of Carthage from the Vandals in 533 is illustrative. This
army had 10,000 comitatenses and foederati infantry, with 3,000
similarly composed cavalry. There were 600 Huns and 400 Herules, all
mounted archers, and 1,400 or 1,500 mounted bucellarii of Belisarius'
retinue. The small force of less than 16,000 men voyaged from the
Bospherus to North Africa on 500 ships protected by 92 dromons, or
war-ships.
Tactics,
organization and equipment had been largely modified to deal with the
Persians. The Romans adopted elaborate defensive armor from Persia,
coats of mail, cuirasses, casques and greaves of steel for tagma of
elite heavy cavalrymen called cataphracts, who were armed with bow and
arrows as well as sword and lance.
Large
numbers of light infantry were equipped with the bow, to support the
heavy infantry known as scutatii (Meaning ″shield men″) or skutatoi
These wore a steel helmet and a coat of mail, and carried a spear, axe
and dagger. They generally held the centre of a Roman line of battle.
Infantry armed with javelines were used for operations in mountain
regions.
Notable
military events during the reign of Justinian included the Battle of
Dara in 530, when Belisarius, with a force of 25,000, defeated the
Persian Emperor’s army of 40,000. In addition to his reconquest of
Carthage, noted above, Belisarius also recaptured Sicily, Naples, Rome
and the rest of Italy from the Goths in a war lasting from 535 554.
Another famous commander of the time was the imperial eunuch Narses, who
defeated a Gothic army at Busta Gallorum on the eastern coast of Italy
in 552.
Towards
the end of the sixth century, the Emperor Maurice, or senior officers
writing for him, described in great detail the Byzantine army of the
period in The Strategikon, a manual for commanders. Maurice, who reigned
from 582 to 602, certainly had extensive military experience. In 592,
he forced the Persians to sign a treaty that regained extensive Armenian
territory for the empire that had been lost in earlier wars. Maurice
then turned to the western frontier in the Balkans. In a war that lasted
the rest of his life, he defeated the Avars and Slavs in battle, but
could not gain a decisive victory.
The
Strategikon's author gives us a fair picture of the Byzantine army and
its troops, including the equipment borrowed from the Herules, Goths,
Slavs and especially the Avars, once barbarian enemies all. Cavalrymen
should have "hooded coats of mail reaching to their ankles which may be
drawn up by thongs and rings, along with carying cases." Helmets were to
have small plumes on top and bows were to be suited to the strength of
each man, their cases broad enough that strung bows can fit in them, and
spare bow strings kept the men's saddle bags. The men's quivers should
have covers and hold 30 or 40 arrows and they should carry small files
and awls in their baldrics. The cavalry lances should be "of the Avar
type with leather thongs in the middle of the shaft and with pennons."
The men were also to have "swords and round neck pieces of the Avar type
with linen fringes outside and wool inside." Young foreigners unskilled
with the bow should have lances and shields and bucellary troops ought
to have iron gauntlets and small tassles hanging from the back straps
and neck straps of their horses, as well as small pennons hanging from
their own shoulders over their coats of mail, "for the more handsome the
soldier is, in his armament, the more confidence he gains in himself
and the more fear he inspires in the enemy." Lances were apparently
expected to be thrown, for the troops should have "two lances so as to
have a spare in case the first one misses. Unskilled men should use
lighter bows."
The
manual then describes horse gear and the trooper's clothing. "The
horses, especially those of the officers and the other special troops,
in particular those in the front ranks of the battle line, should have
protective pieces of iron armor about their heads and breast plates of
iron or felt, or else breast and neck coverings such as the Avars use.
The saddles should have large and thick cloths; the bridles should be of
good quality; attached to the saddles should be two iron stirrups, a
lasso with thong, hobble, a sadle bag large enough to hold three or four
days' rations when needed. There should be four tassels on the back
strap, one on top of the head, and one under the chin."
"The
men's clothing," the Strategikon continues, "especially their tunics,
whether made of linen, goat's hair or rough wool, should be broad and
full, cut according to the Avar pattern, so they can be fastened to
cover the knees while riding and give a neat appearance. They should
also be provided with an extra-large cloak or hooded mantle of felt with
broad sleeves to wear, large enough to wear over their armament,
including the coat of mail and the bow." "Each squad should have a tent,
as well as sickles and axes to meet any contingency. It is well to have
tents of the Avar type, which combine practicality with good
appearance."
"The
men," according to The Strategikon, "should certainly be required to
provide servants for themselves, slave or free ... Should they neglect
this and find themselves without servants, then in time of battle it
will be necessary to detail some of the soldiers themselves to the
baggage train, and there will be fewer men fighting in the ranks. But
if, as can easily happen, some of the men are unable to afford servants,
then it will be necessary to require that three or four soldiers join
in maintaining one servant. A similar arrangement should be made with
the pack animals, which may be needed to carry the coats of mail and the
tents."
The
manual then describes a system of unit identification that sounds like a
fore-runner of medieval heraldry. The flags of a meros or division,
should be the same color. The streamers of its immediate sub-units, the
several moiras or brigades, should also have their own color. Thus, the
manual states, "each individual tagma, (battalion or squadron) may
easily recognize its own standard. Other distinctive devices known to
the soldiers should be imposed on the fields of the flags, so that they
may easily be recognized according to meros, moira and tagma. The
standards of the merarchs (meros commander) should be particularly
distinctive and conspicuous, so they may be recognized by their troops
at a great distance."
The
Strategikon deals more briefly with the infantry. They are to wear
Gothic tunics "coming down to their knees or short ones split up the
sides and Gothic shoes with thick soles, broad toes and plain stitching,
fastened with no more than two clasps the soles studded with a few
nails for greater durability." Boots or greaves are discouraged, "for
they are unsuitable for marching and, if worn, slow one down. Their
mantles should be simple, not like Bulgarian cloaks. Their hair should
be cut short, and it is better if it is not allowed to grow long."
The
descriptions of the armament of the "heavy-armed infantrymen" are
equally terse. "The men of each arithmos or tagma," the Strategikon
tells us, "should have shields of the same color, Herulian swords,
lances, helmets with small plumes and tassels on top and on the cheek
plates - at least the first men in the file should have these - slings,
and lead-pointed darts. The picked men of the files should have mail
coats, all of them if it can be done, but in any case the first two in
the file. They should also have iron or wooden greaves, at least the
first and second in each file."
The
light-armed infantryman, still quoting the Strategikon, "should carry
bows on their shoulders with large quivers holding about 30 or 40
arrows. They should have small shields, as well as crossbows with short
arrows in small quivers. These can be fired a great distance with the
bows and cause harm to the enemy. For men who might not have bows or are
not experienced archers, small javelins or Slavic spears should be
provided. They should also carry lead-pointed darts in leather cases,
and slings."
The
strength of the Byzantine army and navy in 565 is estimated by Teadgold
to have been 379,300 men, with a field army and part of the guards
totaling 150,300, and the frontier troops, part of the guards and the
oarsmen totaling 229,000. These numbers probably held through the reign
of Maurice. However, the largest field army mentioned in the Strategikon
is a force of 34,384 (16,384 heavy infantry, 8,000 light-armed troops
and 10,000 cavalry) which is given as an example of "the past, when the
legions were composed of large numbers of men." Writing of his own time,
Maurice stipulates that an army of more than 24,000 men should be
divided into four components and an army of less than 24,000 into three.
In another section, Maurice describes the formation of cavalry tagmas
of 300 to 400 men into morias of 2,000 to 3,000 and the morias into
meros of 6,000 to 7,000.
Analysis of the Byzantine Militay Collapse
Structural Weaknesses -
Structural history -
- )
Campaign history
Lists of wars
, revolts and civil wars, and battles
Strategy and tactics
Siege warfareMilitary manualsFortifications (Walls of Constantinople- )
It
was in this situation that the disintegration of the military ‘themes
system’, which had been the foundation of the empire's remarkable
success from the eighth to eleventh centuries, revealed itself as a real
catastrophe for the Byzantine state.
The
first advantage of the theme system had been its numerical strength. It
is thought that the Byzantine field army under Manuel I Komnenos (r.
1143–1180) had numbered some 40,000 men. However, there is evidence that
the thematic armies of earlier centuries had provided the empire with a
numerically superior force. The army of the theme of Thrakesion alone
had provided about 9,600 men in the period 902–936, for example.
Furthermore, the thematic armies had been stationed in the provinces,
and their greater independence from central command meant that they were
able to deal with threats quickly at a local level. This, combined with
their greater numbers, allowed them to provide greater defense in
depth.
The
other key advantage of the theme system was that it had offered the
Byzantine state good value for money. It provided a means of cheaply
mobilising large numbers of men. The demise of the system meant that
armies became more expensive in the long run, which reduced the numbers
of troops that the emperors could afford to employ. The considerable
wealth and diplomatic skill of the Komnenian emperors, their constant
attention to military matters, and their frequent energetic campaigning,
had largely countered this change. But the luck of the empire in having
the talented Komneni to provide capable leadership was not a long-term
solution to a structural problem in the Byzantine state itself.
After
the death of Manuel I Komnenos in 1180, the Angeloi had not lavished
the same care on the military as the Komneni had done, and the result
was that these structural weakness began to manifest themselves in
military decline. From 1185 on, Byzantine emperors found it increasingly
difficult to muster and pay for sufficient military forces, while their
incompetence exposed the limitations of the entire Byzantine military
system, dependent as it was on competent personal direction from the
emperor. The culmination of the empire's military disintegration under
the Angeloi was reached on 13 April 1204, when the armies of the Fourth
Crusade sacked Constantinople.
CONCLUSION -
Thus,
the problem was not so much that the Komnenian army was any less
effective in battle (the thematic army's success rate was just as varied
as that of its Komnenian counterpart); it is more the case that,
because it was a smaller, more centralised force, the twelfth century
army required a greater degree of competent direction from the emperor
in order to be effective. Although formidable under an energetic leader,
the Komnenian army did not work so well under incompetent or
uninterested emperors. The greater independence and resilience of the
thematic army had provided the early empire with a structural advantage
that was now lost.
For
all of the reasons above, it is possible to argue that the demise of
the theme system was a great loss to the Byzantine empire. Although it
took centuries to become fully apparent, one of the main institutional
strengths of the Byzantine state was now gone. Thus it was not the army
itself that was to blame for the decline of the empire, but rather the
system that supported it. Without strong underlying institutions that
could endure beyond the reign of each emperor, the state was extremely
vulnerable in times of crisis. Byzantium had come to rely too much on
individual emperors, and its continued survival was now no longer
certain. While the theme system's demise did play a major role in the
empire's military decline, other factors were important as well. These
include:
- An increasing reliance on foreign mercenaries, which also contributed to the Byzantine's decline.
- A long, slow decay in the quality and prestige of the ordinary, non-elite Byzantine infantry.
- A creeping Feudalism that helped to erode centralized administration.
- Increasing emulation of Western (or Latin) weapons, equipment and warfare methods, Gunpoweder, beginning especially during the reign of Manuel I Komnenos.
The
Byzantines lasted and defeated threats time and time again, I hope this
Helps educate why the Eastern Romans were so strong, what made them
strong, how they lasted, and how they ultimately fell…
Thanks for reading, Cheers!
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