27.10.2013 - By ELPINIKI KARAKOSTA
Italy for
almost 15 years faced the menace of both far-right and far-left
terrorism. From the late 1960’s to the early 1980’s the lethal face of
terrorism brought chaos to the Italian state and intimidated society. To
speak of what the 1970s represented in Italy ’s political history is
probably to speak of the present in Greece ; the political situation
that preceded those years in Italy bears resemblance to the situation
that Greece faces today.
In
the late 1960’s Italy faced the rise of extreme right terrorism due
to a perceived threat of the rising Italian Communists. The terrorist
acts were so horrific that they claimed lives of hundred of innocent
civilians to promote panic. Massacres of grand scale were preferred by
the extreme right to exploit the climate of chaos and political
confusion in order to stage a coup and establish a fascist state. This
is the notorious “strategy of tension”. At some point they blamed the
left for these acts in an effort to swift public opinion and support.
The
most horrible act was the bombing on 2 August 1980 at the train station
in Boglona. It was the period of the year that families were going on
vacation and so the train was packed with them. The roof fell onto a
waiting room leading to the death of 84 and injury of 200.
On
the other hand, in the early 1970’s the leftist terrorism rose partly
in opposition to the right terrorism. The left wing radicals exploited
the general sense of dissatisfaction after the end of “the Italian
economic miracle” and escalated a robust social reaction to the economic
crisis into a violent social conflict. The primary goal was the
creation of a revolutionary state through struggle.
It
is true that left acts were mostly symbolic and low in physical injury.
They mostly used the media to challenge the readiness of the Italian
state. However, the vast number of violent incidents occurring
repeatedly for at least seven years on the roll bereft the left
extremists from the widespread support that they enjoyed at first.
Indicatively, in 1977 alone 2400 acts of violence occurred. The group's
most infamous act was the kidnapping of the former Christian Democrat
Prime Minister Aldo Moro, who was trying to reach a "historic
compromise" with the Communists. The kidnappers after 54 days killed
Moro.
The Social Political and Economic Background
Needless
to say the Italian political world was not innocent. The Italian Social
Movement (ISM) was a neo-fascist party, which made it to the parliament
for the most period of the post-war era. A party that condemned the
democratic system and constitution was the fourth most powerful party in
the parliament for the whole 15 years of terrorism, even though there
were accusations that ties between MSI and radical groups existed. Thus,
the right wing Christian Democratic Party (DC) (the leading party of
the post war period) exploited the dynamics of MSI, so that the
exclusion of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from the government could
be guaranteed. Practically, the DC was sympathetic and soft with MSI
because MSI in the 1960’s was the sole backer of the DC government. In
parallel, DC implied links between terrorists and the communists and
socialists.
In
a similar pattern, the left wing found far right terrorism to be
politically in its favour. They either blamed the right for tolerating
right wing terrorism or talked directly about state sponsored violence.
Both of the two adversaries deeply influenced by the Cold War
environment, were caught in a spiral of antagonism that favoured the
polarization of the Italian political life. This opposition formed a
political culture that cultivated radical expectations and in some sense
boosted extremism. Most importantly, the trap was that they both failed
to realize the threat to security by radicalism and perceived
terrorists’ intentions as unserious.
A
famous saying is that “Italian politics are cursed for endless
combinations between politicians”. Indeed, for over thirty years there
were almost 37 political coalitions. Unfortunately, it was the kind of
coalitions that produced weak governments because of the lack of a
cooperative political culture. Every entity prioritized their
short-sighted interests. Most obviously, the political system was fairly
unstable and therefore unable to absorb the violent labyrinth.
The
massive help from abroad, the Marshal Plan, and the modernization of
the production base skyrocketed the Italian economy to the most rapidly
European growing economy between 1950 to 1963. The Italian “economic
miracle” fuelled people expectations and made them optimistic for the
future. However, the major financial world crises of the 1970’s
interrupted this pace and highlighted the pathologies of the growing
economy. Inflation was sharp, unemployment was high, taxation was
intolerable and the country enters recession two times during the
1970’s.
Revenue
inequality between North and South as well as the primitive economic
infrastructure and the delayed economic unification simply added oil to
the fire. What also happened was that the Press was littered with
scandals associating the politicians to the corrupt part of the
intelligence and business world.
The
societal indignation took many forms; demonstrations, strikes, sabotage
even criminal activities. Indeed, the support from the political system
to radical expectations and extremism was a boomerang. The healthy
social movements were dragged into violence and extremism. The gap
between society’s expectations and gratification also justified and
legitimized violence in the eyes of the Italian society.
It
was only reasonable that the widespread 1968 student revolt influenced
Italy too. The Italian students’ activism challenged the archaic
educational system and awakened the workers. It is not by chance that
Renato Curio, the founder of the Red Brigades, started from as a member
of radical organizations that comprised both militant workers and
militant leaders.
Then
again, during this period there were many states that shared similar
social characteristics with Italy but they did not dissent to
violence. It seems most likely that the twenty years that had passed
after the defeat of fascism were not enough to ingrain the democratic
values to the Italian society. Italy ’s political culture revealed
propensity to polarization and extremism.
It
was not until the political system decided to take a responsible turn
that the Italian society realized the utopia of extremism on both sides.
The “historic compromise” of PCI and DC was able to absorb the
consequences of the social transformation. DC dismissed the ankylosis of
the Cold War politics and PCI abandoned the rhetoric for struggle and
revolution. Both of them were progressively forming and alliance to
combat extremism while committing themselves to the initiation of
emergency measures such as more supervision of the security and
intelligence services, special prisons and special courts. It is worth
remembering that the defeat of terrorism was both political and
“military”.
Lessons for Greece
The
1970’s are still with us in Greece this time. The disintegration of
the political system after the economic crisis left a power vacuum that
was partly filled in by a neo-fascist electoral party the Golden Dawn
(GD). Even though there is significant indication that GD is a crime
organization almost ten percent of Greek people admit their support to
the party. On the other hand, Greek intelligence services admit that
there are also left radical organizations that seem to be responsible
for violent incidents that have been occurring around the country since
the burst of the crisis.
Most
disappointing is the fact that the two biggest electoral parties
(SYRIZA and Nea Dimokratia) are dragging themselves into a vicious cycle
of accusations against one another for sympathy to radical
organizations. What they have not realized yet is that their mania with
gaining short-lived impressions and short-sighted political gains
polarizes further Greek society and mutes the voices for moderation.
The
economic crisis is being painfully felt by the Greeks as Greece
enters its sixth year of recession. Unemployment has escalated to
almost thirty percent, the wages are in free-fall, the social safety net
is shattered and the social fabric is falling apart. The
non-progressive unbearable levels of taxation has fuelled Greek society
with feelings of injustice and revenge while numerous corruption
scandals involving the political system has siphoned off moderation from
a big proportion of Greek society. Certainly, the painstaking
consequences of chronic illegal immigration have offered a scapegoat to
the radical right and an outlet to the vindictive feelings of an
oppressed part of the society.
Some
weeks ago there was the first murder of a Greek civilian by a member of
the Golden Dawn and some months before five immigrants have lost their
lives during racist episodes. Well, all the components are there; the
players too. What is worth asking is whether Greece will find itself
trapped in a spiral of violence like Italy was in the 1970’s.
It
can not go unnoticed that the social and psychological traumas of
recession are similar between the two periods. In both cases, the
“brutality” of citizen’s poverization made its mark to the political
scene; it opened a breach to the system of power and revealed that “the
emperor had no cloths on”. As in the case of Italy in Greece the
growing political polarization distorts reality and disorientates
society away from the solution of moderation and political “refinement”
through democracy.
Of
course, there are differences between the two cases that allow for
glimpses of hope that Greece can take a different turn. The absence of
Cold War politics is a significant factor that implies that
parliamentary parties could reach the desirable “historic compromise”
soon enough to avoid a dissent to violence. As for the political
culture, almost forty years (a generation) has passed from the Greek
junta allowing for the new generations to embrace democratic principles.
Thus, an important accelerator (for the better or the worse) is how
the situation in Greek economy will unfold.
Nobody
knows what the future will bring, what is necessary though is for all
parts to realize that political and strategic illusions is their basic
enemy.
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