The Eurasian Union (Laris Karklis/The Washington Post)
For most former Soviet states, the consensus about Russia's overtures in Crimea is very simple: It's bad.
Georgia, itself on the receiving end of Russia's military in 2008, isn't too pleased, with President Giorgi Margvelashvili saying Moscow's moves "represent
flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the sovereign state
[…] and pose a threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity." Estonia's
Foreign Ministry said that Russia's actions threatened the "sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Ukraine, while representativesof Lithuania and Latvia have also spoke out to criticize Moscow.
There
are, however, two states where the reactions are far more complex, and
far more interesting: Kazakhstan and Belarus. On Monday, Kazakhstan's
President Nursultan Nazarbayev was said to "understand" Russia's
position, according to Reuters, which struck many as a very carefully worded way of phrasing it. While Belarus has been relatively quiet on the issue, it has apparently recognized the new, post-Maidan government in Kiev, an unusual break with Moscow.
What
explains these cautious, mixed messages? Well, it's simple: Kazakhstan
and Belarus are the two other states currently signed up to join
Russia's "Eurasian Union": Their very future is tied to the Russian plan
that has been referred to by virtually everypublication as President Vladimir Putin's "dream" of a continent-spanning alliance that would rival Europe and the United States.
It's
an ambitious dream, certainly, designed not only as an economic
alternative to the European Union, but also as a philosophical mission
to make Russia and its neighbors the center of their own geopolitical
landscape (for a great history of the ideas behind it,check over at the Boston Globe).
So
far, Belarus and Kazakhstan are members of the Customs Union, an
economic bloc formed in 2010 as a precursor to the Eurasian Economic
Union, which will itself be formed in 2015. Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan are also expected to one day become members, and Russia long had hopes that Ukraine and even Georgia might join.
Russia's
actions in Crimea, however, are sure to make both Kazakhstan and
Belarus worried. "It's this whole issue of Russian speakers," Fiona
Hill, director of the Center on the United States and Europe at
the Brookings Institution, says in an e-mail. "In each case they've got
something to be concerned about."
The
Kremlin has justified the use of force in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine
with a vow to protect ethnic Russians, an excuse that's easily applied
in other places. In Kazakhstan, there's a significant minority of ethnic
Russians in the north of the country, Hill points out – some 24 percent of the country is said to be ethnically Russian, and the language is widely spoken. While Belarus has fewer ethnic Russians (8.3 percent),
it has largely become a Russophone state and there are a lot of murky
questions about who might succeed Alexandr Lukashenko. Of course, Russia
has agreed to respect the sovereignty of both countries, but they did
that with Ukraine, too: The 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which Russia says
they are ignoring due to the change in government in Ukraine. Neither Kazakhstan nor Belarus has recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the states that broke away from Georgia, by the way.
"Kazakhstan's
Nursultan Nazarbayev has traditionally sought to maintain constructive
relations with both Russia and West, but if a Cold War redux erupts over
inclusion of Crimea into Russia, Astana might be forced to take sides
and therefore lose the opportunity to play great powers off each other,"
Simon Saradzhyan, a research fellow at Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs at Harvard University, explains in an e-mail. "The
same goes for Belarus' Alexandr Lukashenko, who tends to make overtures
to the West whenever he wants a major concession from Russia." U.S. or
European Union sanctions against Russia would hurt both
countries, Saradzhyan notes, as they are now tied economically to
Moscow.
Putin
perhaps knows that Crimea represents a threat to his Eurasian "dream."
On March 5, he called a summit in Moscow with Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev
and Belarus’ Lukashenko, which struck Joanna Lillis of Eurasia Net "as more
propagandistic than substantive" – a chance to shore up support before
May 1, when a pact due to formally create the "Eurasian Economic Union"
is due to be signed.
The
irony here, of course, is that the Euromaidan protests began when
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych turned away from potential E.U.
membership toward more economic cooperation with Russia, and, it was
presumed, eventual membership in the Eurasian Union. As
Yanukovych was forced from Kiev and a pro-Western government installed,
that became less and less likely, and Russia turned its attention to
Crimea. Russia's foreign policy message subtly changed: From one of a
supranational union and cooperation to Russian domination. Kazakhstan
and Belarus can't fail to notice that. Whether they have any better
option right now, however, is harder to say.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/03/11/why-kazakhstan-and-belarus-are-watching-crimea-very-very-carefully/
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/03/11/why-kazakhstan-and-belarus-are-watching-crimea-very-very-carefully/
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