In
terms of pre-conference diplomacy, Turkey is sparing no efforts to
position itself for high input on the agenda and outcome of the upcoming
conference on Syria, jointly sponsored by US and Russsia. This is
reflected in the recent White House visit of the Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, as well as this week's high-level Ankara visit by Saudi
Arabia's crown prince Salman bin Abdulaziz, focusing on the crisis in
Syria.
The
"Geneva II" conference is supposed to attract representatives from both
the Syrian regime and the rebels, who are nowadays on the defensive in
many parts of Syria, including the important Homs province. Backed by
Russia, Iran, and Lebanon's Hezbollah, the government forces have made
impressive gains over the rebels recently, grudgingly admitted in the
Western media, and this simply means that President Bashar al-Assad's
hands have been strengthened and his representatives will exude
confidence at the summit.
Turkey,
on the other hand, will find itself on the defensive, hoping to chart a
middle approach that features continuity with the past, e.g., concert
with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the principal financial backers of the
rebels, while gradually accommodating itself to the uncomfortable, and
somewhat embarrassing, alternative of 'living with the Assad regime',
albeit in a revised and reconstructed format, in the future.
But,
by all indications, Ankara is not quite there yet and that is why after
failing to convince President Obama for a more interventionist US
course on Syria, Mr. Erdogan has now fixed his gaze on Saudi Arabia and
the (increasingly unpopular and unrealistic) "no-fly" zone in parts of
Syria. Yet, with Russia and Iran reportedly providing critical military
equipment to Syria and thus bolstering the military's position, the
"no-fly" idea is a bad idea that no one in NATO favors, given the
prohibitive costs, and the sooner Erdogan drops it, the better.
Indeed,
the crux of dilemma for Turkey is that it officially adheres to a
"regime change" policy toward Syria that is bankrolled by the Gulf
Cooperation Council states led by the Saudis, which has so far yielded
no positive result, save throwing Syria into the bosom of a monumental
chaos threatening its break-up. Unable to jettison the rhetoric behind
this failed policy, Turkey is nowadays exhibiting the symptoms of a
cognitive dissonance, whereby the force of reality on the ground in
Syria indicating regime survival is not felt on the policy level in
Ankara.
What
then is Turkey's exact approach toward the forthcoming conference?
Turkey has been quiet on Russia's insistence on Iran's inclusion,
principally because that would mean adding to Damascus's regional bona
fide, irrespective of Arab League's overt hostility to Bashar's
presidency. Nor is it entirely clear what influence Turkey wields on the
rebel groups, whose political and military wings do not necessarily
meet eye to eye. Therefore, the net impact of Turkey on the coming
conference and its results and prospects is under a thick cloud of
question marks, partly because Ankara's own attitude is likely
experiencing the tumults of slow re-adjustments in light of the staying
power of Assad's regime. With the rapidly diminishing chances of Ankara
playing 'kingmaker' in Damascus, Turkey's leaders have to make tough
choices in the near future and they are indeed apt to make the wrong
ones, that is, sticking to their hard-line anti-Assad approach bent on
political transition to a post-Assad regime in Syria. That would mean
risking a lengthy civil war in Syria, growing mass refugees, spillover
conflict, and internal political polarization over the appropriate Syria
policy. Avoiding these risks means, on the other hand, a candidate
admission by Mr. Erdogan and his foreign policy team that their Syria
policy has proved a failure and their stubborn continuation of that
policy, in cohorts with the Saudis, may be a recipe for disaster,
warranting a policy U-turn of sorts.
Certainly,
US can play a big role in instigating such a necessary shift in
Ankara's hitherto unsuccessful "regime change" approach vis-a-vis
Damascus. In the coming days and weeks, much depends on the diplomatic
savy of US Secretary of State John Kerry to lead the pack, instead of
letting crucial regional players like Turkey and Saudi Arabia play the
spoiler role. A litmus test of second Obama administration's foreign
policy, US's ability to lead on Syria hinges on several factors, one of
which is the ability to insulate itself from the counterproductive
efforts of allies such as Turkey, that today instead of "zero problem"
with neighbors has managed to make a mess of its regional relations, a
net result of its "neo-ottoman" ambitions to shape the post-Arab Spring
Middle East. For sure, time to jettison those unrealistic ambitions has
definitely arrived.
Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, Ph.D.
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