Battle of Manzikert: Turks Defeat Byzantines, Emperor Captured

"Battle of Manzikert (1071), Romanus IV and Alp Arslan"
Fifteenth century French miniature
[Note the combatants are depicted in armor inconsistent with the 11th century]
(Unless otherwise indicated, all illustrations are from Wikipedia)

Today in Military History: August 26, 1071

Once again, good reader, I return to the Middle Ages for another chapter in my continuing series of posts on military history. Today I present one of the decisive battles which figured in the decline of the Byzantine Empire.

Background

The Byzantine Empire had stabilized its borders by 1025 after the loss of its Hispanic and most of its Italian territories to the Visigoths and Ostrogoths, and its North African, Palestinian, and Syrian lands to the forces of the Arab Conquest.

In 1025 the Emperor Basil II died. He had led a number of successful military campaigns during his reign, including the re-establishment of East Roman control of the majority of the Balkan Peninsula by defeating and conquering the Bulgarian Empire. For his successful campaign against this hated rival, Basil acquired the cognomen Bulgaroktonos or "Bulgar-slayer." [To read more of Basil's war on the Bulgars, please see my Burn Pit post from July 29, 2012 entitled, battle_of_kleidion.]

Between 1025 and 1067, the East Roman Empire suffered through the reigns of 9 emperors and two empresses. Finally, Romanus IV Diogenes assumed the Byzantine throne in 1068. Romanus was a veteran military commander, but was handicapped by impetuosity. In his first two years as emperor, Romanus led two expeditions against the Seljuk Turks, a growing menace to his eastern borders. Neither expedition was entirely successful.

In 1070, Romanus devoted his time to making various unpopular reforms in Constantinople. Despite his preoccupations with administrative matters, Romanus sent out an army under command of one of his best generals, Manuel Comnenus. This Byzantine army engaged the Turks, but was defeated and its commander captured. Shortly afterward, the Seljuk ruler Alp Arslan (which means "valiant lion" in Turkish) invaded eastern Byzantine territory, capturing the fortresses of Manzikert (modern-day Malazgirt, Turkey) and Khliat (present-day Ahlat). Arslan, rather than face a possible attack by the Byzantines, offered to make a treaty with the East Romans. This was done, and the Seljuks began concentrating upon its conflict with the Fatamid Caliphate of Egypt.

Byzantine Empire in 1025 at the death of Emperor Basil II

In the spring of 1071, Emperor Romanus offered to renew the treaty with Seljuks. Apparently, he felt Arslan would reject the proffered treaty out of hand, so he also began preparations to launch another military expedition, this one intent on retaking the two fortresses, especially Manzikert. He began to march eastward in the late spring. Alp Arslan received word of the Byzantine advance at about the same time as he received the proposed treaty. Arslan was leading a Seljuk force besieging the city of Aleppo. He rejected the treaty, raised the siege, and marched directly towards the Armenian border. Arslan himself collected troops from his allies and vassals en route.

Prelude to the Battle

Romanus's advance across Asia Minor was accompanied by several events that did not bode well for the expedition's success. First, he chose to leave one of his more competent generals, Nikephoros Botaneiates behind. Nikephoros was suspected of disloyalty by the emperor. Instead, he chose to take Andronikos Doukas with him, the eldest son of John Doukas, one of his rivals for the imperial throne, who certainly was disloyal to him. At the same time, the emperor began to distance himself from his troops and officers, eventually establishing a separate baggage train and encampment for the imperial party, refusing to share in the hardships of the campaign.

On the march from the Halys River to Sebasteia, his guard of Frankish (possibly German or French) mercenaries suffered some casualties at the hands of the local population, whose property and lands they had pillaged en route. They then had the gall to complain to the emperor about their treatment. Romanus tried to cow them into submission by threatening them with force from the other units encamped around them. When that failed to achieve the desired effect, Romanus then dismissed them from the campaign.

By late June the imperial forces had reached the city of Erzurum where a decision had to be made as to which direction the army should proceed and how exactly Romanus wished to implement his strategy. Some of the generals suggested he move on, try to outflank the sultan and take the war into Seljuk territory and bring him to battle. Others argued that the emperor should wait, fortify the surrounding towns and strengthen their garrisons, lay waste the countryside to deprive the Turks of necessary supplies when they approached, and await events. The latter course of action seemed inappropriate, the more so since the Byzantine army was itself in danger of running out of supplies if it waited in one place for too long. Therefore the order was given to move on.

[The emperor's plan seems to have been to take both Manzikert and Khliat, which lay to the south on the western shore of Lake Van. However, he was completely misinformed of the movements of Alp Arslan and his troops, who had, in fact, not returned to Iraq at all. Thus, while Romanus thought the Turkish leader was some way off, he was actually only just over 100 miles away, with his scouts covering and reporting every move made by the Byzantine army.]

From Erzurum the emperor advanced eastwards. The troops were ordered to collect enough provisions for two months. This was a considerable amount that entailed the use of large numbers of pack animals, and possibly carts, slowing the army down considerably. A substantial body of the Pecheneg allied force, closely followed by Frankish troops under Roussel de Bailleul, were ordered ahead to the region around Khliat – which Romanus clearly perceived as the more difficult of his first objectives – with instructions to collect fodder and provisions, prevent more enemy damage to the harvest and to secure it for the imperial advance.

Byzantine Army

Contemporary chronicles gave widely conflicting numbers for the East Roman army. Muslim histories give figures of 100,000 to 300,000, but these are clearly exaggerations to help the "legend" of Alp Arslan. Considering the demographics of the Byzantine Empire at that time, a figure of 40,000 seems to be acceptable. The infantry was composed of about 10,000 Byzantine recruits from both the western and eastern provinces, with Armenians and Georgians probably comprising most of the eastern levies. One of the unique infantry units in the army was the Varangian Guard, the emperor's bodyguard. Its men were originally recruited from the Rus' of the northern forests of Eurasia. However, by this time a number of Englishmen had migrated to Constantinople – rather than live under the conquering Normans – and enlisted in the unit.

Varangian Guardsmen, wielding their famous 2-handed axes
(Image courtesy of http://www.grippingbeast.com)

The Byzantine cavalry was apparently a collection of mercenary units, with the exception of one unit composed of up-and-coming Byzantine nobles called the hetaireia. In addition Normans, Franks, and Bulgarians were likely recruited as the heavy cavalry, with Pechenegs, Turks (possibly Magyars), and Cumans providing the horse archers. [It seems likely that the resources of the empire were not completely stable, so that the East Roman armies of this period began to rely more and more on paid mercenaries. Once a campaign was completed, they would be paid off and sent on their way.]

Seljuk Turkish Army

Neither the size nor the composition of the Seljuk army is well documented. It is known that it was slightly outnumbered by the total Byzantine army. A likely figure of 30,000 is generally accepted. The army was probably all mounted, owing to its ability to raise the siege of Aleppo and rapidly move northeast to confront the East Roman forces. Perhaps as much as 20 percent of the Seljuk army was made up of heavy cavalry, with the remainder consisting of mounted archers. As descendants of Asiatic steppe nomads, the Seljuks depended on speed to attack or withdraw at need, and the massive barrages of the bow-armed horsemen.

Seljuk horse archers firing
(Image courtesy of http://www.perry-miniatures.com)

Battle of Manzikert

Before reaching his first objective, Romanus detached another contingent under Joseph Tarchaneiotes, with orders to assist Roussel's Franks and Pechenegs in taking and garrisoning Khliat. According to one Byzantine historian, this force included the elite of the army, most of the better and more battle-hardened units. It is possible to surmise that the remaining imperial forces must have numbered some 20,000 or so.

The two detachments of troops, first under Roussel and then Tarchaneiotes, proved to be a major blunder. Unaware of the closeness of the Seljuk forces – which were by now approaching both Khliat and Manzikert from the east – the two Roman commanders were suddenly confronted by what seemed to be a substantial enemy force. What happened next is a mystery. It seems both forces simply turned around and moved with great haste away from the Seljuks, whom they seem neither to have reconnoitered, nor to have reported to the emperor, a mere 30 miles or less to the north. Both divisions marched towards Melitene on the Euphrates and took no further part in the campaign. [Turkish chronicles state that both forces were destroyed in battle, while the Byzantine histories are completely silent on their fate. There is some hint that treachery played some role in the disappearance of these soldiers, but that is unconfirmed.]

At this point, Romanus had now lost some of his best units. Unaware of the events to the south, he approached Manzikert, which capitulated without a struggle. The Seljuk garrison was released without punishment. Romanus set up his camp outside the fortress and on the banks of a small river. The city was located on the north-western edge of a roughly rectangular rocky steppe region, which stretches for some ten miles along a northwest – southeast axis, before rising gradually to the foothills, north-east of Khliat. This was an area thoroughly known to the Turks, but less familiar to both Romanus and his subordinates, a fact which again proved to be a significant disadvantage to the Byzantines.

On the morning after the occupation of Manzikert, probably August 24, the emperor was informed that some of the detachment sent out to forage for supplies along the route south, had been attacked by Turkish warriors. The commander of the left wing was ordered to chase the raiders off but in dealing with what turned out to be a much larger force than expected, soon found his units lured into ambushes and surrounded. He was therefore compelled to withdraw to the camp. The emperor still believed that this could not be the main Seljuk army. He now sent out a much stronger force of cavalry under the Armenian commander Nikephoros Basilakes. Unfortunately, Basilakes ignored the tenets of Byzantine tactics with respect to feigned retreats and the tactics of nomadic peoples. He allowed his forces to engage in an uncontrolled pursuit of what he took to be retreating Seljuk troops. In reality, the Turks had set an ambush, and Basilakes' troops were slaughtered or put to flight. Basilakes himself was captured.

Romanus now realized that the Turks were present in greater strength than he had thought. However, he was still entirely oblivious of Arslan's closeness. He ordered the whole left wing division to advance and drive the Turks off but they had now reached the foothills surrounding the plain. It was only when their commander, Nikephoros Bryennios, reached the spot of the ambush on Basilakes that he learned what the true situation was. By this time the Turks had arrived in strength and launched a determined attack on Bryennios' division, attempting to encircle it. The latter sensibly ordered a disciplined withdrawal, covering the movement of his units by occasional charges. However, the Turks now had the initiative. Bryennios himself was wounded although he was able to fight again the next day.

The emperor now recognized that he was facing the main Turkish force and that his information regarding Arslan's movements was clearly inadequate. The army now readied for a general assault, but when drawn up for the advance the Turks had withdrawn completely into the hill country to the southeast. That evening, Seljuk warriors appeared once again in the twilight and swept in to harry those caught off guard outside the fortifications. Panic ensued as the troops tried to hurry back inside the camp; while those inside were equally confused and the rumor spread that this was a full-scale assault on the camp. Almost immediately, the Turks disappeared. Although occasional raids took place during the night, no major attack was launched.

Next morning, August 25, another Seljuk detachment attempted to seize control of the riverbank opposite the Roman camp but was quickly driven off. Shortly afterwards, however, a considerable body of Turkic mercenaries deserted to the Seljuks – their distant cousins – causing some anxiety that the remainder would follow. They assured the emperor of their loyalty and the worry subsided. In addition, Romanos rejected a Seljuk peace embassy as he wanted to settle the eastern question with a decisive military victory. He further understood that raising another army would be both difficult and expensive. The emperor attempted to recall Tarchaneiotes, who was no longer in the area.

Battle of Manzikert, first phase (mid-morning to early afternoon)
(Map courtesy of http://byzantiumnovummilitarium.blogspot.com)

On the morning of August 26, the Byzantine army drew up outside the camp and prepared to advance on the Turkish host. The terrain over which the battle was fought stretched over open, rocky ground from the city of Manzikert itself, with the entrenched and fortified imperial camp pitched a short distance to the south or southeast. From the city to the foothills to the south and southeast was a distance of between 7 and 8.5 miles of stony rolling steppe land, the land rising gradually before breaking up an area of shallow gullies and streambeds. At some distance from the Roman lines, but well in advance of this rougher land, Arslan had drawn up his own, less numerous force.

The Roman force advanced at a steady pace while the Seljuks harried the Roman line with arrows while steadily moving back. By mid-afternoon the Byzantine center division had reached and overrun the Seljuk camp and was still pushing ahead. When the afternoon drew to a close, the emperor's own division had reached the rougher terrain ringing the edge of the plain across which his army had steadily advanced. Losses thus far were minimal, but on the flanks things were beginning to get out of hand. The constant shower of arrows caused considerable annoyance to the Byzantine forces. Frustration motivated many of the units to attempt to charge their foes to bring them to battle. The Turks before them hesitated and then feigned retreat, drawing the imperial forces into the rougher ground where a series of ambushes had been prepared.

Battle of Manzikert, second phase (early afternoon to early evening)
(Map courtesy of http://byzantiumnovummilitarium.blogspot.com)

It was now almost sunset, and Romanus and his army had been unable to come to grips with his enemy. He was no longer in close contact with the wings and his own army, which had left the main camp more-or-less undefended, was without supplies. To continue the advance into unknown and much bumpier terrain would have been suicidal. An orderly withdrawal was now the only reasonable course of action.

It was at this point that disaster struck. Having given the order to withdraw, the center began to pull back. However, on the right wing the signal to withdraw was misunderstood by some soldiers and officers, who believed that the emperor had fallen. The rearguard was essential to the success of this withdrawal for it was the rearguard that would cover the units falling back and enable the maneuvers to be carried out without undue haste and panic. Unfortunately, the rearguard was under the command of Andronikos Doukas, a sworn enemy of Emperor Romanus IV.

According to contemporary accounts, Doukas deliberately failed to follow the normal procedures. Rather than wait to cover the retreat of the main line, he reversed his own lines and simply marched back to the camp, leaving the emperor's division exposed and the wings entirely isolated. Most sources accept that this was a deliberate act of treachery, designed to leave the emperor in the hands of the enemy. Further, Doukas may have hoped to bring about Romanus's death – an event that would leave the path to the throne of a member of the Doukas clan uncontested. These accounts also report the fact that Doukas deliberately spread the rumor that the emperor had died to persuade the remaining divisions to abandon the field.

Battle of Manzikert, final phase (early evening to sunset)
(Map courtesy of http://byzantiumnovummilitarium.blogspot.com)

Seeing what was happening, the Seljuks now launched an all-out attack. The Byzantine right wing crumbled and was routed, fleeing back across the plain. The left wing seems to have withdrawn in order until the Turks that had cut the right wing off from the center swept into its rear and forced it to break up in flight. Romanus now attempted to recall the panicking units and rally them to his own standard. However, his signal was ignored and the central division also began to break up and withdraw under the barrage of Turkish arrows that now fell from all sides. The emperor and a small part of the center were now entirely surrounded. Romanus attempted a final stand until his horse was killed under him and after a brief struggle on foot he was knocked down. The next day, as the Turks went through the bodies collecting weapons and armor, was the Byzantine emperor recognized and taken before the Sultan.

Aftermath

Byzantine casualties were fairly heavy, with between 2000 and 8000 soldiers killed, and another 4000 captured. Turkish casualties are unknown, but were probably less than 10 percent of their force.

Footnote #1: While Manzikert has been considered a great military disaster, modern historians have downplayed this assessment. Granted, a major East Roman army was destroyed, but more than half of the original army was still intact and had not struck a blow (and some of these units would fight for Romanus during the upcoming civil war). It took nearly another decade for the Seljuk Turks to occupy central Asia Minor, eventually reaching the Aegean Sea. Many historians consider Manzikert to be the beginning of the decline of the Byzantine Empire.

Byzantine Empire (in red) in 1081, ten years after Manzikert

Footnote #2: In the aftermath of the battle, Emperor Romanus IV was brought before Alp Arslan as a prisoner. After making the Roman ruler bow before him, Arslan then placed his foot upon the neck of Romanus (apparently a sign of submission and humiliation). Then, several chronicles report the following conversation taking place.

Alp Arslan: "What would you do if I were brought before you as a prisoner?"
Romanos: "Perhaps I'd kill you, or exhibit you in the streets of Constantinople."
Alp Arslan: "My punishment is far heavier. I forgive you, and set you free."

For the next week, Alp Arslan treated Romanus with great kindness, and negotiated a peace treaty and a ransom for the emperor. After giving up several cities, Alp Arslan settled on a ransom of 1.5 million gold pieces immediately, with an additional 360,000 gold pieces annually. Romanus was then laden with many gifts and given an escort back to his capital. Shortly after his return to his subjects, Romanos found his rule in serious trouble. He was defeated three times in battle against the Doukas family and was deposed, blinded and exiled. Soon after, he died as a result of an infection caused by brutal blinding.

"Alp Arslan humiliates Romanus IV," artist unknown
From a 15th century French translation of Boccaccio's
De Casibus Virorum Illustrium (On the Fates of Famous Men)
Currently in the Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris

Footnote #3: The Byzantine loss at Manzikert, and the resurgent forces of Islam, were both likely causes for the calling of the Crusades.