Νταβούτογκλου, Άλλαξε ο Μανωλιός και έβαλε τα ρούχα του αλλιώς!!!
Δυο σύντομα άρθρα του Δικτύου Βολταίρου (Γαλλία) για τη νέα εξωτερική πολιτική της Τουρκίας. (μτφ. Κριστιάν)
Ο Νταβούτ στη Βαγδάτη στις 10 και 11 Νοεμβρίου.
Είχε
ντυθεί στα σκούρο για να συμμορφωθεί με την σιϊτική παράδοση κατά τη
διάρκεια του πένθους της Ασούρα. Άντε στην Αθήνα με φουστανέλα…
|
-Η Τουρκία και το Ιράν κάνουν έκκληση για κατάπαυση του πυρός στη Συρία
Η Τουρκία και το Ιράν κάνουν έκκληση για κατάπαυση του πυρός στη Συρία
Η
δήλωση αυτή δείχνει την πλήρη ανατροπή της τουρκικής θέσης για την
οποία μιλήσαμε μετά το ταξίδι του κ. Νταβούτογκλου στο Ιράκ
(10-11.11.2013) [ 1 ].
Από
δω και στο εξής η Άγκυρα εγκαταλείπει τη στάση της ως ιστορικός ηγέτης
των σουνιτών για να υιοθετήσει αυτή της συναινετικής περιφερειακής
δύναμης.
Πρόκειται
επίσης για πλήρη αντιστροφή της ιρανικής θέσης που θεωρεί από δω και
στο εξής την καταπολέμηση της τακφιριστικής τρομοκρατίας ως λιγότερο
σημαντική από την προσέγγισή της με την Ουάσιγκτον και την αναβίωση της
οικονομίας της.
Δυστυχώς,
η δήλωση αυτή αντικρούεται από τη μαρτυρία ενός οδηγού φορτηγού που
συνελήφθη, ενώ μετέφερε χιλιάδες βλήματα όλμων και μια ντουζίνα
πυραύλων. Δήλωσε ότι πήρε το φορτίο του κοντά σε ένα φράγμα της
τουρκικής χωροφυλακής που δεν θα μπορούσε να το αγνοήσει. Αυτή η
μαρτυρία αμφισβητήθηκε φυσικά έντονα από τον Τούρκο υπουργό Εσωτερικών
Μουαμέρ Γκιουλέρ. Ωστόσο, επιβεβαιώνει πολλές άλλες μαρτυρίες εδώ και
τρία χρόνια και τα παράπονα Σύρων πολιτών ενώπιον της τουρκικής
δικαιοσύνης.
Η δήλωση αυτή δεν έχει τίποτα το αυθόρμητο. Είχε συζητηθεί στη συνάντηση μεταξύ των κκ. Νταβούτογκλου και Ζαρίφ τη 1η Νοεμβρίου, στην Περιφερειακή Διάσκεψη για τον Αφοπλισμό, και προβλέφτηκε σε περίπτωση επιτυχίας των διαπραγματεύσεων Ιράν-ΗΠΑ.
Οι δύο άνδρες είχαν ήδη συναντηθεί με θερμότητα στο περιθώριο της Γενικής Συνέλευσης των Ηνωμένων Εθνών, στις 23 Σεπτεμβρίου στη Νέα Υόρκη.
Οι δύο άνδρες είχαν ήδη συναντηθεί με θερμότητα στο περιθώριο της Γενικής Συνέλευσης των Ηνωμένων Εθνών, στις 23 Σεπτεμβρίου στη Νέα Υόρκη.
[ 1 ] “ Η Τουρκία διαψεύδει τη στροφή της εξωτερικής πολιτικής της », δείτε παρακάτω, Voltaire Network 24 Νοεμβρίου 2013.
Η Τουρκία διαψεύδει τη στροφή της εξωτερικής πολιτικής της
Η
αμερικανική εφημερίδα αναφέρει ότι η Τουρκία επεδίωκε να δημιουργήσει
ένα σουνιτικό άξονα στη Μέση Ανατολή, υποστηριζόμενη μεταξύ άλλων από τη
Μουσουλμανική Αδελφότητα. Ωστόσο, μετά την πτώση του Μοχάμεντ Μόρσι
στην Αίγυπτο και τη στρατιωτική ήττα της στη Συρία, η Άγκυρα επιδιώκει
σήμερα να προσεγγίσει τις σιϊτικές ηγεσίες: το Ιράκ και το Ιράν.
Ως απόδειξη, η New York Times είχε παρατηρήσει το ταξίδι του Αχμέτ Νταβούτογκλου, υπουργού Εξωτερικών, στη Βαγδάτη στις 10 και 11 Νοεμβρίου.
Είχε ντυθεί στα σκούρο για να συμμορφωθεί με την σιϊτική παράδοση κατά τη διάρκεια του πένθους της Ασούρα (φωτογραφία).
Ο τουρκικός τύπος παρουσιάζει την επίσημη διάψευση με ειρωνεία.
« Turkey, Its Allies Struggling, Tempers Ambitions to Lead Region », par Tim Arango, The New York Times, 21 novembre 2013, δείτε παρακάτω
http://www.voltairenet.org/article181115.html
Turkey, Its Allies Struggling, Tempers Ambitions to Lead Region
Ahmad Mousa/Reuters
By TIM ARANGO
Published: November 21, 2013
ANKARA,
Turkey — As Egypt’s Islamist demonstrators faced an imminent
confrontation with security forces in Cairo last summer, the advice they
received from Turkish officials was adamant: Stand your
For
Turkey, the counsel was as much about supporting its Islamist allies as
it was about trying to prop up its waning regional influence. With the
Islamists ousted from power by the military in Cairo, the demonstrators
represented a last stand for Turkey’s effort at building a new Sunni
Muslim axis of power — with Turkey as an anchor.
But the
protesters were routed, and hundreds were killed in a campaign that not
only neutered Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood but also Turkey’s ambitions.
Now Turkey is rethinking its effort to reshape the region, and is
instead reaching out to the Middle East’s two Shiite Muslim powers, Iraq
and Iran.
“There is no doubt that romanticism over the Middle
East is gone,” said Suat Kiniklioglu, a former official in the
governing Justice and Development Party, known by its Turkish initials
A.K.P., who now runs a research center in Ankara, Turkey’s capital.
The
idealism of leading a new Sunni alliance has given way to a more
pragmatic approach centered on securing access to oil and gas for its
economy, improving conditions for Turkish businesses and finding a way
out of the intractable conflict in Syria. Many analysts describe the
shift as a return to the mantra of “zero problems” with neighbors, a slogan that had previously guided Turkey’s foreign policy under the governing party.
One
of the most striking indications of the shift came when Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu recently visited Baghdad and said “there is no
limit to cooperation” between the countries. Mr. Davutoglu dressed in
black, a symbol of mourning that is central to the Shiite faith, prayed
at a famous Shiite shrine, met the spiritual leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani, and the militant Shiite leader Moktada al-Sadr, and talked
about embracing his Shiite “brothers” in the holy city of Karbala. He
had already hosted his Iranian counterpart in Turkey, and officials say
Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, will visit Baghdad and
Tehran.
Turkey, in supporting the rebel fighters in Syria, is
on the opposite side of that war from Iraq and Iran, who have been
strong supporters of the government of Bashar al-Assad. But as the
international community pursues a political solution to the conflict,
Turkey has fallen in line with the diplomatic path, in part because it
is frightened by the rise of Islamist radicals leading the rebels along
its border. It would have preferred Western-led military action in
Syria.
When it comes to Iran, Mr. Assad’s strongest ally,
Turkey is trying to position itself to be able to persuade Tehran to at
least give up support for Mr. Assad, in particular, as part of any peace
plan. That, at least, would allow Istanbul to save face after having
been adamant that Mr. Assad leave office.
“They are not saying
yes, they are not saying no,” said a Turkish official who has been
involved in the talks with the Iranians. “They know they cannot support
Assad forever.”
For the last couple of years Turkey and Iraq
have had a strained relationship, centered on a bitter personal feud
between Mr. Erdogan and the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.
Turkey had supported the Sunni opposition within Iraq, and when Mr.
Maliki targeted the former Sunni vice president Tariq al-Hashemi on
terrorism charges in late 2011, Turkey gave Mr. Hashemi refuge. In Iraq,
Turkish businesses suffered boycotts and Turkish workers found
themselves detained for work permit violations, while Mr. Maliki shut
down an important route through Iraq for Turkish trucks.
Turkey
and Iran have managed to maintain a relationship, if often a strained
one, mainly because of energy interests. As a rising economic power but
with few of its own sources of energy, Turkey relies on Iran and Russia
for natural gas and oil imports. Even so, some Turkish officials see
Iran as their greatest rival, and in backing the rebels in Syria, Turkey
hoped to remove Syria from Iran’s sphere of influence.
Before
the revolts and revolutions of the Arab Spring, Turkey used its
economic clout and cultural influence, including from the soap operas
that are wildly popular around the region, to expand its reach around
the Middle East, even imagining a regional alliance along the lines of
the European Union. The civil war in Syria, though, has laid bare the
limits of Turkey’s so-called soft power, as it has been the Iranians’
hard power — their commando units and spy services — that have had the
greatest impact on the conflict. Turkey’s intelligence agency,
historically focused on counterintelligence within the country, has
found itself with few capabilities within Syria or Iran, and has come
under sharp criticism by the West for allowing weapons to reach
extremist jihadi groups fighting in Syria.
For Mr. Erdogan,
the missteps and failures of Turkey’s Middle East policy have cost him
stature in the region, just as the harsh police crackdown on antigovernment protesters in Turkey last summer tarnished his image, and that of his party, in Europe and the United States.
After
a popular uprising ousted the Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak, Mr.
Erdogan was hailed as a hero in Cairo and his party gave technical and
financial support to the Brotherhood, seen as ideological brethren to
the Justice and Development Party. Now Mr. Erdogan would probably be
forbidden by Egypt’s new military rulers from setting foot in the
country. A planned trip to the Gaza Strip by Mr. Erdogan, a visit once
seen as a triumphant symbol of his support for Palestinian rights — what
had been the source of his popularity on the Arab street — is off
indefinitely.
“Erdogan is no longer a hero in the Middle
East,” said Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the chairman of Turkey’s main opposition
party, the Republican People’s Party. “He believed he could do
everything by himself, and design everything himself.”
As an
opposition figure, Mr. Kilicdaroglu is expected to criticize the prime
minister, but similar sentiments are voiced privately by government
officials close to the governing party.
Analysts say that with
hindsight, it is clear that Turkey’s vision as a leader of a new Middle
East is at best hopeful, given the burdens of history and the legacy of
Turkish rule over the Arab world during the times of the Ottoman
Empire. For that reason, they added, the shift back to its policy of no
enemies is not completely unexpected.
“Arabs don’t want to be bossed around by the Turks,” said a Western official in Ankara.
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