The Byzantine Republic: People and Power in New Rome, Anthony Kaldellis, Harvard University Press, 312 pages
The
textbooks say the Byzantine Empire was a theocratic autocracy uniting
church and state under an all-powerful emperor believed by the
Byzantines to be God’s viceroy and vicar. Nonsense, says Anthony
Kaldellis, professor of classics at Ohio State University. The Byzantine
Empire was a continuation of the Roman Empire and even of the Roman
Republic. Its political ideology was fundamentally secular and grounded
in the ancient Roman republican belief that government exists to serve
the common good. Its people no longer had a legal role in the election
of leaders or legislators, but they often played an extralegal role in
the making and unmaking of emperors, whose legitimacy depended on
popularity and not on a claim of divine right or constitutional
correctness. Emperors therefore ruled pragmatically and not fanatically,
often disappointing the Church to please the people.
This is fresh air for Orthodox Christians, who have had to
bear the accusation of Byzantine theocracy longer than Western
Christians have had to bear the accusations of the Crusades and the
Inquisition. But Kaldellis’s The Byzantine Republic also provides
useful criticism of modern Western political thinking, as well as
portentous, if inadvertent, insight into progressive democratic thinking
and where it will take us.
His book is a frankly revisionist attack on the
field of Byzantine studies, which has perpetuated age-old Western
prejudices at odds with the historical record. Kaldellis takes aim
mostly at academics of the 1930s and their imitators, but the roots of
prejudice go back much further to the anti-Orthodox propaganda of the
Middle Ages. The Orthodox Byzantines refused to recognize the supremacy
of the Pope of Rome over all things sacred and secular, and they allowed
their emperor far more authority over the Church than papal partisans
could countenance. Later, during the Enlightenment, as the West moved to
exclude religion from politics, the Byzantines were held up as the
prime example of “caesaropapism” under the mistaken belief that the
Byzantine emperor ruled as both king and pope, with no separation of
church and state.
As Western political thought evolved,
more faults were found in the Byzantine model. The empire lacked a
written constitution with enumerated rights, separation of powers,
democratic procedures, or any other explicit limits on the authority of
the emperor, who seemed to rule by divine right as an absolute monarch.
By then, the empire had ceased to exist, so Westerners with no knowledge
of Greek or access to the relevant documents had no way of checking the
historical reality against the disparaging claims of Edward Gibbon and
others, for whom the Byzantines served as a convenient starting point
for the Whig writing of history—the primeval nightmare of superstitious
despotism out of which the Western world awoke and arose.
Some kinder 20th-century scholars have
offered modest corrections to the conventional narrative, denying the
accusation of caesaropapism and celebrating Byzantine art and culture,
but no one has gone as far as Kaldellis in asserting the secular basis
of Byzantine politics or in demonstrating the blindness of Western
historians who only understand politics according to Enlightenment
categories of thought.
Reading Roman history, but not rightly,
early modern Western political theorists divided governments into two
basic categories, monarchies and republics, defining the latter as
self-governing polities without a monarch and understanding the former
as either absolute or constitutional. As Kaldellis explains, the ancient
Greeks and Romans saw things differently. Their two basic categories
were kingdoms and commonwealths. A kingdom, in their experience, was the
possession of a king ruled by his might for his own satisfaction. A
commonwealth—res publica in Latin, politeia in Greek—was
an independent polity variously governed but administered for the good
of all. Commonwealths could therefore be monarchies, aristocracies, or
democracies. Cicero himself said as much, even while bewailing the
waning of senatorial power.
The standard story that the Roman
republic ended with Caesar Augustus becoming emperor is therefore simply
wrong, says Kaldellis. The republic lived on, albeit in a new phase,
the Principate, in place of the earlier Consulate. Historians call the
republic’s later, third phase the Dominate—during which military
emperors, ruling from wherever military necessity demanded, came to be
addressed for the first time in Roman history as Domine, or
“Lord.” The fourth, final, and longest phase, by far, was Byzantium,
lasting from the fifth to the 15th century, during which emperors ruled
as civilians from the city officially named New Rome but commonly called
Constantinople (“Constantine’s city”) and founded originally as
Byzantion (Byzantium in Latin).
All along, the empire’s people called
themselves Romans. (The term “Byzantine” is a modern Western invention.)
And all along these Romans identified their empire as a res publica or politeia,
boasting that unlike other empires theirs was committed to the common
good. From beginning to end, “Byzantine” Roman emperors were obliged to
justify their actions by appeals not to divine right or divine law but
to the common good, and the undisputed arbiter of the common good was
the politeia, which included everyone—the aristocracy, the
bureaucracy, the army, the clergy, and the various classes of people:
merchants, tradesmen, farmers, etc.
Any one of these could challenge an
emperor’s right to rule on the basis of his failure to serve the common
good. Byzantine emperors therefore lived in fear of the people and did
whatever they could to keep the people happy, presenting themselves as
civil servants working tirelessly for the public’s benefit.
The people did not live in much fear of
the emperors, however. They were often irreverent and disloyal, verbally
abusing the emperor in public, even in his presence, and disregarding
new laws they didn’t like. “Byzantine history abounds in instances of
men and women who refused to obey an emperor’s orders, mostly on
religious grounds,” writes Kaldellis. With a single exception, popular
uprisings succeeded in forcing emperors to make concessions or else be
deposed. The one exception in the empire’s thousand years was the Nika
revolt of 532, when Justinian the Great, at the urging of Empress
Theodora, sent soldiers to slaughter the murderous mob assembled in the
Hippodrome to acclaim another emperor. (There were earlier instances of
such brutality, but they fell under the Dominate of the third and fourth
centuries.)
Harder for modern Westerners to
appreciate is the relationship between the emperor’s authority and the
empire’s laws. Romans of every age prided themselves on their respect
for law, which was closely related to their belief in the common good
and one of the features of Romanity that they believed set them above
other nations. Their emperors were also expected to respect the law, yet
there was no law they could not change. In Western eyes, this made the
emperor not just an autocrat whose word was law but an unlimited
autocrat—an absolute monarch.
Yet this common Western view is based
less on Byzantium than on the “New Absolutism” of the early modern West,
which grew out of early efforts by Western princes to theorize their
claims of “sovereignty” against papal claims of the same. With the
Reformation, these peculiarly Western claims on sovereignty became more
urgent and expansive, producing both Catholic and Protestant
justifications for the “Divine Right of Kings,” according to which the
king, as sovereign, is accountable to no one but God. For the French
Catholic Jacques-Benigne Bossuet, the king personified the state: “Tout l’État est en la personne du prince,” he wrote, or as the Sun King would say, “L’État c’est moi.”
Against this New Absolutism came
counterclaims subjecting the king to other sovereigns: common law,
natural rights, constitutions written or unwritten, the will of the
people. Continued religious and political contention drove Westerners
toward opposite poles of political idealism, pitting the monarchical
idealism of Divine Right against anti-monarchical “republican” idealism
variously conceived. The arguments in favor of the latter are more
familiar to us today. Our Founding Fathers availed themselves of all of
them, with scant regard for consistency and without really solving the
practical or theoretical problem of limited sovereignty. For if the
people are sovereign, what is to protect us from democratic absolutism
since the people decide what laws to make, what rights to respect, and
even how to read the Constitution? Who is to tell the people they are
wrong, and who is to stop them when they don’t listen?
The Byzantines never bothered to ask such
questions because they never needed to. Their concern was not the
source of government—sovereignty—but, says Kaldellis, the purpose of
government. They did not therefore absolutize the emperor. They knew him
to be a mere mortal and a sinner accountable to both God and the politeia. They did not believe in Divine Right.
They believed that God ordained rulers as
“revenger[s] to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil” (Rom. 13:4),
but they also knew that God often un-ordained rulers for His own
reasons. They were tempted like many people to believe in royal blood,
but that didn’t stop them from throwing over incompetent emperors “born
in the purple.” And if any Byzantine emperor had declared, “The state is
me,” everyone in earshot would have thought him insane.
Without a monarchical ideal, the Byzantines never needed
an anti-monarchical ideal. They never absolutized natural rights or
Roman law or even the Roman people. They, too, were mere mortals and
sinners, and what mattered most was the good of the politeia, not
the will of the people. Their will was not even the only will that
mattered: There was God’s Will to consider, and God was understood often
to give people not what they wanted but what they needed. He dealt with
people not according to fixed principles of justice but in ways that
would best bring about each soul’s salvation. The Byzantine term for
this was oikonomía, and it is still an important aspect of Orthodox Christian pastoral theology.
The Byzantine approach to politics was likewise “economic.” The supreme law was the safety of the commonwealth. Everything else was discretionary. The
emperor’s divine warrant as a “revenger” of evil was understood
pragmatically to mean that rulers were to restrain evil, not eradicate
it. Allowance was made for “humanity, commonsense, and public utility,”
in Justinian’s words, with the understanding that some evils are not
easily outlawed. Christian emperors were therefore slow to ban many
evils condemned by the Church but popular with the people such as
slavery, prostitution, pornography, and gladiatorial games.
♦♦♦
Kaldellis admits
that Christian teaching supported the Byzantines’ republican commitment
to the common good, and he judges Christian Byzantium more republican
than the two previous phases of the republic—the Principate and the
Dominate. But in his eagerness to argue against the conventional
theocratic reading of Byzantine history, he errs in the opposite
direction toward an essentially secular reading. “The Roman polity was
only accidentally Christian,” he writes, and the result was a
fundamentally secular monarchical republic “masquerading, to itself as
much as to others, as an imperial theocracy.” The Byzantines were
confused, given to “conflicting modalities of thought” and to shifting
“situationally” between secular thinking and religious thinking. Their
pragmatism and their republicanism were both products of secular
thinking, at odds with Christianity’s supposed idealism and imperialism.
Here Kaldellis’s own reliance on modern
Western conceptions of Christianity interferes with his analysis. He
writes, for instance, that “secular” is a “fundamental category of
Christian thought.” This is arguably true of Western Christianity, which
is prone to distinguish sharply between the categories of sacred and
profane, natural and supernatural, clergy and laity, “religious”
clergymen and “secular” clergymen, “lords spiritual” and “lords
temporal,” the City of God and the City of Man. But it is not obviously
true of Orthodox Christianity. The Orthodox have no exact theological
equivalent of “secular” and think Catholics make too much of such
categories.
Kaldellis’s use of “secular” is even
further away from Orthodox thinking. He seems to limit Christian
thinking to thoughts about the Christian religion, as if all other
thoughts are not Christian and therefore “secular.” So when a Byzantine
source attributes a victory to divine intervention, he’s thinking
religiously, and when the same source attributes a victory to superior
generalship, he’s thinking “secularly.” Kaldellis therefore cannot
understand how Byzantine Christians could reconcile the deposition of an
emperor by the people with the ordination of that emperor by God. He
can only understand them as inconsistent—and more truly secular than
Christian.
Surprisingly, Kaldellis identifies
Jean-Jacques Rousseau as the Western theorist closest to the Byzantine
tradition, citing passages from The Social Contract that do sound
somewhat Byzantine. Rousseau defines a republic as “any state ruled by
laws, whatever may be the form of administration.” He assigns
sovereignty to the people and makes government their minister. And he
stresses the importance of moral consensus and sees a need for a civil
religion. When he writes that the most important laws are not those
written down but those “in the hearts of the citizens,” Kaldellis says,
Rousseau “reveals himself a classical rather than a modern thinker.”
This is a rather superficial reading of
Rousseau. Byzantium was an actual, historical reality—a particular
people with a particular past, religion, and legal, political, and
cultural tradition—whereas Rousseau’s republic is yet another modern
Western theoretical ideal, based on a very un-Roman, un-Christian, and
un-Byzantine understanding of human nature and history. In his
theoretical republic, all issues of value defining the common good are
settled by the “general will,” which is not bound by any religion,
tradition, institution, constitution, contract, or even reality. The
people are free to build a new civilization as they please; they just
need an enlightened lawgiver to show them how. (Rousseau saw himself in
that role and actually offered his assistance in revolutionary lawgiving
to Poland and Corsica.)
But what Kaldellis sees in Rousseau—the
idea of a people expressing their will in the Byzantine way, asserting
their sovereignty over the government extralegally—is why Rousseau still
rivals Marx as the chief prophet of progressivism, and why progressive
academics can be expected to embrace Kaldellis’s recasting of the
Byzantines as secular democrats. Kaldellis shows that democracy can mean
different things to different people. To American conservatives, it
means orderly elections and strict adherence to written law and legal
precedent, but to many American progressives it means public
demonstrations, civil disobedience, and mob intimidation. The left
understands that if the will of the people alone decides the common
good, then the raised fist is a better gauge of good than a show of
hands, for when the system fails to satisfy, some people will riot and some people won’t.
Brian Patrick Mitchell is the author of Eight Ways to Run the Country and a protodeacon of the Orthodox Church.
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