by Siggurdsson
"Battle of Kambula" by Melton Prior
Engraving published in March, 1879 London Illustrated News
(Unless otherwise indicated, all illustrations are courtesy of Wikipedia)
Engraving published in March, 1879 London Illustrated News
(Unless otherwise indicated, all illustrations are courtesy of Wikipedia)
It has been quite a while since I addressed the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 in my historical presentations. So, for today I will discuss the fight at Kambula, which demonstrated the foolishness of assaulting troops who not only occupied high ground, but were well-fortified with artillery support.
Background
In December 1878, following the death of several British citizens at the hands of the Zulus, authorities in the South African province of Natal issued an ultimatum to the Zulu king Cetshwayo, demanding that the perpetrators be turned over for trial, and that the Zulu army be disband. These requests were refused and the British began preparations to cross the Tugela River and invade Zululand. [The British government in London did not want another colonial war on their hands; this conflict was abetted entirely by British South African authorities.] On January 11, led by Lord Chelmsford, British forces advanced in three columns with one moving along the coast, another from the north and west, and the Center Column advancing through Rourke's Drift towards Cetshwayo's base at Ulundi.
The shock of the defeat at Isandlwana on January 22, 1879 caused a catastrophic drop in morale among the British forces invading Zululand. The coastal column was besieged by Zulu forces at Eshowe, and the northern column under Lt. Col. Sir Henry Evelyn Wood was the only one capable of offensive action. However, as it consisted of only 3000 soldiers, its options were limited to harassing raids of Zulu kraals (enclosures for cattle, equivalent to a European castle), hoping to keep the northern Zulu forces from joining the main army.z
Chelmsford ordered Sir Evelyn Wood's troops to attack the abaQulusi Zulu stronghold in Hlobane. Lieutenant Colonel Redvers Buller, led the attack on Hlobane on March 28. However, as the Zulu main army of 20,000 men approached to help their besieged tribesmen, the British force began a retreat which turned into a rout; they were pursued by 1,000 Zulus of the abaQulusi who inflicted some 225 casualties on the British force. The British retreated to their prepared position at Kambula.
British Army
The defences on Kambula consisted of a hexagonal laager formed with wagons that were tightly locked together, and a separate kraal for the cattle, constructed on the edge of the southern face of the ridge. Trenches and earth parapets surrounded both sections, and a stone-built redoubt had been constructed on a rise just north of thekraal. A palisade blocked the hundred yards between the kraal and redoubt, while four 7-pound artillery pieces were positioned between the redoubt and the laager to cover the northern approaches. Two more guns in the redoubt covered the north-east.
Two companies were assigned to the redoubt; another company occupied the cattle kraal and the remaining infantry manned the laager. The gunners had been told that if the Zulus got in close they were to abandon their guns and make for the laager. In all, Wood's force mustered 121 Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, 1,238 infantry, 638 mounted men, and 180 native auxiliaries. With headquarters staff, it totalled a bit under 2,200 men, of whom 88 were sick in hospital.
Battle of Kambula, March 29, 1879
Map courtesy of http://www.britishbattles.com/zulu-war/khambula.htm
Zulu Army
The Zulu warriors were formed in regiments by age, their standard equipment the shield and the stabbing spear, calle the assegai. The formation for the attack, described as the "horns of the buffalo," was said to have been devised by Shaka, the Zulu King who established Zulu hegemony in Southern Africa. The main body of the army delivered a frontal assault, called the "chest," while the "horns" spread out behind each of the enemy's flanks and delivered the secondary and often fatal attack in the enemy's rear. [A fourth formation, known as the "loins," was a reserve of older warriors, often used to exploit breakthroughs. This formation was usually facing away from the battle, so they would not get too excited and enter the battle too soon.]
Cetshwayo, the current Zulu King, fearing British aggression in the run-up to war. He took pains to purchase firearms wherever they could be bought. By the outbreak of war the Zulus had tens of thousands of muskets and rifles, but many were of poor quality, and the Zulus were ill-trained in their use. The Zulus also looted dead British soldiers of their weapons after battlefield wins. The regiments of this Zulu impi had participated in the battle of Isandlwana and other fights in the war, and were again eager for another "washing of the spears."
Zulu warrior with assegai and war club
Photograph by Cornelius H. Patton (c. 1916)
Image from the digital library of New York Public Library
Prelude to the Battle
A British patrol, out early in the morning, brought in a Zulu defector with information that the camp was to be attacked at midday. The patrol reported that the Zulu Army could be seen approaching. Col. Evelyn Wood, knowing that the enemy would take its time to organize its attack, ordered the men to have their breakfast. Then, at 12:45, the orders were given: the tents were struck, the reserve ammunition was distributed, and the troops took up their battle stations.
As the troops moved to their posts they could see the Zulu right horn, circling north out of British artillery range before halting north-west of the camp. The left horn and centre of the impi continued westwards until they were due south of Kambula.
Battle of Kambula
At 1.30 Lt. Col. Redvers Buller suggested his mounted troops sting the right horn into a premature attack, which was agreed to. The men rode out to within range of the massed Zulus, fired a volley and then galloped back, closely followed by a great wave of 11,000 Zulu warriors. As soon as the horsemen had reached Kambula, and cleared the field of fire, the British infantry opened fire with support from their four 7-pounders firing shell, and then when the Zulus got closer, the artillerymen switched to the deadly anti-personnel canister shot. A small number of Zulus managed to burst into the laager, and were repelled with bayonets, while the bulk of the advance was held at bay by steady British rifle shots and cannonfire. Some of the Zulu force swung right to come in against the western sides of the laager, but were met with equally effective resistance. After about half an hour the Zulu right horn drew back to the north-east.
"The Zulu attack at the Battle of Kambula," artist unknown;
Image courtesy of http://www.britishbattles.com/zulu-war/khambula.htm
At 2.15, as the right horn made its withdrawal, the left horn and centre surged up out of the ravine, their leading warriors falling to crossfire from the laager and kraal as they came over the crest. However, more and more swarmed on to the palisade glacis between the cliff and the defenders, funnelling into the gap between the kraal and laager. The Zulus soon forced their way into the cattle kraal and fought hand-to-hand with men assigned to its defense. The cattle in the kraal hampered both sides, but with Zulu pressure mounting, the heavily outnumbered British troops managed to extricate themselves and pull back to the redoubt. Zulu riflemen were now able to open fire from behind the walls of the kraal to give their advancing comrades cover. At about this time the right horn came on again from the north-east, charging across the north face of the redoubt towards the guns and the eastern sides of the laager.
Although now attacked on both sides, Wood appreciated that the situation to the south was critical and ordered two companies to clear the Zulus off the glacis. Led by Major Hackett the men formed in line with bayonets fixed and charged across the open ground, forcing the Zulus back over the rim. The troops then lined the crest and opened volley fire into the packed warriors in the ravine. The counter-attack had succeeded perfectly but Hackett's men suddenly found themselves under fire from their right, where Zulu marksmen had concealed themselves in a refuse pit. Hackett sounded the 'Retire' and his men returned to the cover of the laager, but not before losing a colour-sergeant, a subaltern and himself receiving a blinding head wound. The sight of this withdrawal encouraged the Zulus in the ravine to charge again, but along the narrow killing zone in front of the laager they could not this time prevail against the controlled volleys from behind the wagons and the redoubt.
On the north side the Royal Artillery men kept firing their guns in the open, not taking cover, and poured round after round directly into the right horn.
The Zulus charged again and again, with unwavering courage, but the head of each charge was shot away and at about 5 pm Wood sensed the impetus was going out of their attack. Two companies moved to clear the kraal and lined the rim of the cliff with a further company to fire into the dead ground.
"The closing stages of the battle of Kambula…" by Orlando Norie
From The Zulu War: A Pictoral History by Michael Barthorp (2002)
As soon as the Zulus began to pull away eastwards, Woods ordered Buller and the mounted troops to mount his men up and pursue. The Zulus were harried mercilessly for 7 miles, mounted troops firing one handed with carbines from the saddle or spearing them with discarded assegais. The commander of the Frontier Light Horse (FLH) told his troopers to take no prisoners and told them, "no quarter boys..." The FLH men singled out the local abaQulusi warriors for their special attention, chasing them as far as Hlobane and extracting a savage revenge for their comrades killed the day before at Hlobane. The FLH commander recalled that they "…butchered the brutes [Zulus] all over the place" while Buller was, "like a tiger drunk with blood." Following the cavalry, the British infantry and African auxiliaries combed the field killing any wounded or hiding Zulus The merciless pursuit of the retreating Zulu army at Kambula caused some controversy in Britain itself, but from a military point of view, it had presented an invaluable opportunity to inflict crippling losses on the Zulu army.
Aftermath
A total of 785 Zulu dead were counted in the immediate vicinity of the camp by burial parties two days after the battle, but their total losses significantly higher. Some of the dead had been carried away by friends or relatives but had to be abandoned during the pursuit. Many more warriors retreating from the battle were overtaken and killed by British mounted troops and furthermore, many wounded warriors died before they could reach home and help. The following day 157 bodies were counted along the line of retreat with reports of more in the distance. The official British estimation at the time put the total Zulu losses of dead and wounded at "nearly 2000," while the Zulus thought that their casualties were at least as high or higher than those suffered at Isandlwana.
By contrast to the heavy Zulu losses, only 18 British soldiers were killed, and 8 officers and 57 men wounded, 11 of whom later died. Kambula is considered the turning point of the war, for the British demonstrated that shield and assegai were no match for an entrenched force with artillery and the Martini-Henry rifle.
Footnote #1: Zulu ruler Cetshwayo had given his impi commanders strict orders, forbidding them from attacking prepared British defenses. [The lessons of the battle of Rourke's Drift were soaking in…] However, the Zulu were eager for another victory against the Brits, and their king's strictures were ignored.
Footnote #2: The morale effect of the battle of Kambula on the Zulu army was also severe. Their commander, Mnyamana, tried to get the regiments to return to the Zulu capital of Ulundi but many demoralized warriors simply went home. The shock of the defeat contributed to a weakening of the Zulu resolve to maintain armed resistance to the British invasion
Footnote #3: After the less-than-successful initial invasion of Zululand, a second invasion was launched in June (partly because British commander Chelmsford had received information that his replacement was on the way to southern Africa, and Chelmsford wanted to get the final glory of defeating the Zulus for himself). The final decisive battle of the war took place on July 4, 1879 at Ulundi, the Zulu capital.
Δεν υπάρχουν σχόλια:
Δημοσίευση σχολίου