Chemical weapons and the chemical weapons convention

Posted On Δευτέρα, 10 Σεπτεμβρίου 2012 at by Λουκάς Δ. Συμπεράς

Not many years ago in autumn of 2003 “a mere chemistry academy student in Moscow managed to design a home-made bomb and to plant it in the heart of Moscow, just a quarter mile away from the Kremlin. He claimed to be connected to radical neo-bolsheviks, which he hardly was”.[1] Nevertheless, an academic carrier is not necessary to manufacture a chemical weapon. In the age of globalization where the access to knowledge is just a web surfing, internet can provide any information. Anyone of us with access to knowledge of chemicals or randomly could mix readily available household products to create relatively dangerous concoctions.[2]

Beyond any doubt we live in a globalized environment, where cooperation among states and people from every corner of this world is at the forefront, establishing organizations such as the UN, singing treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and creating terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. The question is: bearing in mind the above do we stand a chance to put an end in the proliferation and production of chemical weapons? Isolating chemical weapons characteristics from Bailey’s speech: 

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easy, inexpensive, effective and difficult to detect, the issue of proliferation becomes dubious. How close we are in a world without chemical weapons, taking into consideration the forthcoming scientific and technological advancements in their production, detection, decontamination and destruction?

The aim of this assignment is to examine the current global chemical weapons regime and any issues surrounding it, such as terrorism, so as to predict its future status quo. In order to successfully accomplish this aim, the paper will first try to give an overview of what is a chemical weapon, and thereafter to present its global legal status (CWC) alongside with its drawbacks (issues of chemical stockpiles destruction and national implementation of the treaty) and challenges (issues of universality and science and technological advancements). Thereafter alternative strategies will be presented in combating the proliferation of chemical weapons. In addition, an attempt will be made to shed light on the issue of terrorism and its involvement in chemical weapons proliferation. Thus, all the above will provide us all the necessary information to evaluate the current chemical weapons situation and verify or not Bailey’s opinion for the continuation of the proliferation of chemical weapons. 

                           I.      Chemical weapons

Chemicals can be traced back to the ancient times, but chemical weapons emerged in the end of 17^th century, as a product of the modern chemical industry. According to the CWC, chemical weapon is defined “any toxic chemical or its precursor that, through its chemical action, can cause death, injury, temporary incapacity or sensory irritation”.[3] The main characteristics of chemical weapons are that vary in terms of their lethality, their complexity, the way they cause injury and death, and their persistence (short and long term).[4]

Chemical weapons belong in the broad family of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)[5]. The main characteristic of those weapons is “their potential to generate truly catastrophic levels of death and destruction”. Their devastating effects have stigmatized them in the conscience of the public and helped military professionals to foster a taboo against their use in war. A taboo, that first codified in the 1925 Geneva Protocol[6] and was strengthened many decades later by the 1993 CWC[7].             

                       II.      The Chemical Weapons Convention  

The CWC is a multilateral treaty, the first its kind that bans a whole category of weapons. In fact, it bans the production, possession, proliferation, transfer and use of chemical weapons. It came into force on 29 April 1997 in order to regulate the chemical weapons legal status and help the international community to deal with the issue of proliferation and the destruction of the already existed chemical weapons.

The CWC is implemented by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW receives states-parties’ declarations, which detail chemical weapons-related activities or materials and relevant industrial activities. Thereafter, becomes its responsibility to inspect and monitor states-parties’ facilities and activities that are relevant to the convention, aiming to ensure compliance. [8]

What is of great importance for the future production and detection of chemical weapons is that the CWC introduces two innovations in its body. The first one is that groups them into three schedules, based on the risk they pose to the convention. In particular: “schedule 1 chemical and precursors pose ‘high risk’ to the convention”; “schedule 2 chemicals are toxic chemicals that pose a ‘significant risk’ to the convention”; and “schedule 3 chemicals are usually produced in large quantities for purposes not prohibited by the CWC but still pose a risk to the convention”.[9] It is worth mentioning that the CWC permits the use of herbicides in the operations of guerrillas, as well as tear gases for riot control and subduing suspected criminals, and also in warfare.[10] By grouping them the CWC has a unique chance to map all the already existed chemical weapons and anyone yet to come. This fact will light any shadows on chemical weapons and will help the OPCW to better deal with them.

The second innovation of the convention is that it introduces an extremely radical verification tool, the right to request a ‘challenge’ inspection[11] of any facility suspected of violating the treaty, without right of refusal, which is available to any state party. The importance of this mechanism lies in its role as a deterrent, since its very existence would certainly make difficult any effort of a state-party to conceal non-compliant facilities.[12]

 Nevertheless, challenge inspection faces three major problems-challenges. The first one is that has not yet been used. The second one concerns the case that a state-party A requests such an on-site challenge inspection in facilities of a state-party B, which are located in a non- state party and the latter is not in favor of the inspection. The same question would arise for a challenge inspection in facilities of a non-state party A which are located to a state-party B.[13] The third challenge is a section in the United States’ CWC implementing legislation, which entitles the president to “deny a request to inspect any facility in the United States in cases where the President determines that the inspection may pose a threat to the national security interests of the United States”.[14] The above section might be a gravestone to the viability of the mechanism, since it is possible other states-parties to follow the same example in the future.

The issues regarding the challenge inspection mechanism is not the only problem that the CWC has to deal with. For that reason article 8[15] of the convention establishes ‘special sessions’ of state-parties in order to monitor the operation of the convention, to deal with issues concerning its implementation and compliance and cure any irregularities. The first one of those sessions is the Annual Conference of states-parties, which reviews “short-term operation, activities and developments (in particular, those aspects more relevant to the planning of the following year’s programme of work and budget)”.[16] The second session is the Review Conference, which takes place every five years and state-parties “undertake reviews of the operation” of the convention and those reviews would “take into account any relevant scientific and technological developments”.[17] 

 III.      The Destruction of Chemical Weapons 

One of the tasks, that the 2^nd Review Conference which took place on April 7-18, 2008, had to face was the fact that 11 years after its entry into force, many states haven’t destroyed their chemical weapons stockpiles yet. On the contrary they have requested and granted new deadlines[1].

Beyond any doubt the negotiations of the CWC underestimated some important factors regarding the destruction of chemical weapons, such as the huge financial burden, the technological complexity and politics of course. As a result, Russia and USA, which posses the 90% of the global declared stockpiles, failed to meet the deadline of 29^th April 2007. In addition, contrary to the rules of the convention which state clearly that the cost of the destruction must be borne by the possessor states, many states have asked for and received financial and technical assistance. Russia continues to be the biggest recipient of international assistance for destruction, despite the low progress, and in the case of Albania the total verification cost was covered.[2]

Nevertheless, the issue of the destruction of stockpiles does not end here. According to Pfirter director-general of the OPCW “six states have declared over 71,000 tonnes of chemical-warfare agents, and as of today, 43% of these agents have been verifiably destroyed”. [3]  Therefore another nearly 60% leaves to be eliminated before the final deadline of April 2012. However, there are concerns that both Russia and USA may not achieve the target, since the short time length and the difficulty of the target demand an “unremitting political and financial commitment” on their part, virtues that they haven’t shown yet. Moreover, such an extension should have been coupled with a realistic schedule for the final destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles.[4]  

In case of non-compliance to the final extended deadline the convention will have to deal with the issue of a new deadline, which on its own will raise two serious problems. The first one is that at the latest Review Conference of 2008 avoided to examine the above unpleasant possibility. Its next Summitwill be in 2013 and taking into consideration that it is the only body of the CWC eligible to amend the convention and the final extended deadline is in 2012, there will be a breach of the CWC. The second issue rises as a continuity of the first, since non-compliance to the convention will cause a “major confrontation” among the state-parties and the main casualty of such a confrontation would be “the multilateral chemical weapons disarmament and non-proliferation regime itself, rather than individual countries”.[5]

                       IV.      Scientific and Technological Challenges

Another challenge for the CWC rises by the advance of science and technology. Many new developments may affect the task of implementing convention’s constraints on production of toxic agents for military or terrorist purposes.[6] The convergence between chemistry and biology alongside with the availability of powerful computers has enable new methods of chemical synthesis and catalysis, which can be used for the development of new either lethal or non-lethal chemical agents, eliminating at the same time emissions that might call attention to illicit production.  

Particular attention should be granted to the issue of non-lethal chemical agents, due to their special status. It has already been mentioned that there are exceptions in this category of weapons in the CWC, for instance their use is allowed for riots control. These developments pose the convention in danger, since their production is unchecked and a possible use of toxic chemicals for non-prohibited purposes may undermine its prohibitions. In addition, another challenging issue is that the “activities to develop ‘nonlethal’ weapons based on incapacitating agents would not easily be distinguishable from aspects of an offensive chemical weapon program”. As a result, the states-parties of the CWC have to address these risks that non-lethal weapons entail and decide for their future status. “Should the development and acquisition of such weapons be accepted, there would clearly be a need (as is the case of riot control agents) to agree on declaration provisions for such weapons (types, quantities, and delivery systems)”.[7]

Nonetheless, the scientific and technological advances provide new opportunities and ways to fight the effects from the use of chemical weapons, as well. In particular, two years ago a new decontamination system, against chemical agents GD, VX and HD, was formulated using a liquid solution on a solid sorbent.[8] Another advancement the hyperspectral sensors could enable identification of chemicals and of their signatures from space. “Nanotechnology could be used to identify traces of chemicals or biological materials in equipment, etc. Techniques for tagging chemicals could help track where a particular chemical is coming from, or what it is being used for. Even in the area of slightly more traditional analytical chemistry and quality assurance, a lot has changed over the past decade that could make field analysis for verification purposes more reliable and robust, showing less cross-sensitivity, lighter in weight, and cheaper”.[9]

                        V .      Challenges from Chemical Industry

Alongside with the new technological advances, the global chemical industry has undergone significant changes in the field of business, particularly in how and where it manufactures chemicals.[10] A global dispersal of fine chemicals production in multipurpose facilities is in progress, which is difficult to be monitored by the OPCW inspectors.[11] In detail, a new trend is the production of many polymers and commodity chemicals in large multipurpose facilities close to sources of raw materials (Persian Gulf region). Another trend is that contract manufacture of pharmaceuticals intermediates has spread to a few developing countries, creating industrial bases that, without adequate oversight, could manufacture chemical agents.[12] Moreover, the disavowal of chemical weapons by the former Soviet Union states has left many experienced workers in the production of chemical agents in the disposal of rogue states.[13]

However, the most impressive change in chemical industry’s businesses is the increase in sales of chemicals through automated exchanges via the internet. A trend that entails the danger, without the adequate controls, key intermediates to fall in terror networks hands, but with the proper oversight of purchases could detect clandestine chemical agent production just as is done currently for detecting narcotics manufacture.[14]

Beyond the changes we have to admit that chemical industry supported the CWC throughout its negotiation and is actively involved to the full and fair implementation of the convention through dialogue with the OPCW. “Under the auspices of the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA), the world’s largest chemical producing countries provide consensus input to the OPCW and their respective National Authorities, which implement the Convention country by country”. Undoubtedly, the global chemical industry is united in support of the CWC, recognizes its responsibilities in the fight against the proliferation of chemical weapons and actively participates in the effort to promote the universal character of the convention.[15]

                           V I .      Universality

So far, many important challenges, for the CWC and the non-proliferation effort, have been mention, but few are as crucial to the ultimate success of the convention as the one posed by the need to achieve universality. According to Pfirter the “universal adherence to the Convention is crucial to the realisation of its object and purpose. The absence of any State from the Convention—whether large or small, rich or poor, but particularly one that might have an active chemical programme and/or stockpiles—undermines the goal of achieving a total ban on these weapons”.[16] Therefore, “Universal adherence would strengthen the norm against chemical weapons by demonstrating that this principle is accepted in many different political, cultural, religious, economic, and legal settings”.[17]

To date, only eight United Nations member-states remain outside the Convention. The reason is for Israel and Myanmar, which have signed but not ratified the convention and the non-signatories Angola, Egypt, North Korea,Somalia, South Sudan and Syria.[18] In an effort to provide additional political emphasis for the goal of attaining universality of the CWC and convince the non state-parties to join in, the Executive Council of the OPCW adopted the Action Plan for the Universality of the CWC.[19]

However, the task of universality alone will not solve the problem of proliferation of chemical weapons. Universality goes along with the national implementation of the CWC. It is worth mentioning that more than 100 states-parties have not yet notified the OPCW of the actions taken to implement Article 7.[20] In response to that of great importance matter and in connection with the OPCW’s work the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1540.[21]

Beyond any doubt, the international community appears united in its goal to put an end to the proliferation of chemical weapons. The above seem to reinforce the taboo against the use of chemical weapons and weaken the advantages of their use, as well. However, military counterterrorism actions, such as that “in October 2002 when the Russian security forces used an opiod form of fentanyl in an attempt to incapacitate Chechin separatists who were holding 800 hostages in a Moscow theatre”[22], have to keep us in alert.        

                      VII.      Terrorism and Chemical Weapons

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 caused great concern, as for whether or not terrorist organizations are able to conduct a chemical weapons attack. In an interview conducted in November 2001 Osama bin Ladin head of Al-Qaeda, claimed to have nuclear and chemical weapons for purposes of deterrence.[23] Of course, such statements can spread only fear and panic to the public. Thus it would be wise to have a brief overview on past terrorist incidents that entailed the use of chemical weapons and avoid any presumptions.

The most outstanding attack with chemical weapons took place in Tokyosubway system, by the Aum Shinrikyo cult that launched a sarin attack, in March 1995. “Although 7 died and 2000 were injured the figure would have been much higher had the sarin been pure. The nerve gases are very potent chemicals so that one-gram of this gas can kill thousands of people”.However, the ease that it can be diverted from the production of pesticides does not guarantee success, since “highly quality laboratories and storing methods to keep these nerve gases at a pure and stable form are required”.[24] From the above incident there are three important facts to take into account. The first one is that takes place two years before the CWC entry into force. The second one is its level of success that is not equivalent to the magnitude of fear that caused all over the world. The third and most important is that since 1995 such an attack did not take presence. Even the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and in Madrid on 11 March 2004, used conventional explosives.      

Another aspect that we have to consider is the group motivation of terrorist organizations by Dolnik. He groups them in three categories:

  

·        “Groups Motivated Primarily by Separatist Goals in Combination with Ethnic Nationalism (LTTE, PKK, Chechens). Most of the suicide terrorist groups that have in addition used or attempted to use or acquire CBRN agents fall into this category.

·        Groups Motivated Primarily by Political Goals in Combination with Radical Islamist Ideology (Hamas, Hizballah). The groups in this category have shown a much less discriminatory approach in their suicide operations, but have displayed little interest in CBRN agents.

·        Groups Motivated Predominantly by Islamist Ideology (al Qaida, PIJ). Groups in this category are even less discriminatory in their suicide bombings than those of the preceding category”.[25]

Undoubtedly terrorism is terrorism and the grouping of terrorist organization will not save us from a terrorist chemical attack. However, knowing the enemy’s abilities and intention gives you better chances in the fight. The latter argument has also its special meaning for the terrorist groups-willing to use chemical weapons. In particular, the severe military retaliation that would follow, a large-scale terrorist chemical attack operates as a deterrent. However, the latter deterrent is not part of any convention, but one of many other strategies that the international community has launched in order to deter a weapons of mass destruction attack.

                          VIII .      Strategic Responses to Chemical Weapons Proliferation

The world after Cold War has changed. New ideas about the control of chemical weapons have arrived and especially after 9/11 the role of the military in combating and responding to proliferation has taken on an increasing salience. Military operations have taken place all over the world in the name of proliferation. Many of them had pre-emptive character (Iraq 2003) and some others preventive (Osirak 1981) or both of the characteristics (the Gulf War 1991 and Desert Fox 1998).[26]

All the above are based in the Defence Counter proliferation Initiative (CPI) that was unveiled in December 1993 by the US Secretary of Defence Les Aspin.[27] It is worth mentioning that one of its goals refers clear ‘to defeat an enemy armed with WMD.[28] Moreover, in a statement that the US Joint Chiefs of Staff published in 2004 defines counter proliferation as military activities taken to defeat the treat or use of WMD, with its objective being to deter, interdict, attack, and defend against the range of WMD acquisition, development, and employment situations. However, counter proliferation is a strategic tool that entails always the danger to trigger a broad agitation and has to be used wisely.

Another strategic tool against terrorist networks and their will to acquire chemical weapons is the National Strategy Combating Terrorism, launched by Bush administration in 2003. In particular, this effort refers to the use of every instrument of national power (diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military) to fight and weaken terrorist networks, strategy that undoubtedly will deter any future chemical weapons attack.[29]

The fight against chemical weapons proliferation has to be given in many field, as was presented in the above strategy in combating terrorism. In this tremendous effort the participation of the public and media is more than welcomed. Both of them could contribute effectively in the implementation of the CWC, by pressing their national governments to do so, providing information to the authorities regarding terrorism and illegal trade of chemicals, and providing effective information to people in case of a chemical incident. Therefore, the proliferation of chemical weapons seems to be a common universal fight.

                                 IX.      Conclusion

In many respects, the threat posed to global peace and security, by the proliferation of chemical weapons, has greatly receded after the CWC entry into force. Almost all member-states of the UN are state-parties of the CWC approaching the goal of universality. In the numerous challenges to the convention by the scientific and technological advances OPCW is present, using them in advantage of the inspection system. The fight against terrorism and particularly against the terrorist groups willing to acquire chemical weapons practically appears successful. Of course, there are still ongoing challenges (national implementation and destruction of the declared stockpiles) and terrorism along with rogue nations is still searching ways to acquire chemical weapons. However, the strong commitment of the international community to combat proliferation makes us confident of its success.

BY PANAGIOTIS I. PSYLLOS - http://global-chessboard.blogspot.gr/

[1] Pogorely, Mikhail. Prospects For Russia-US Cooperation in Preventing WMD Proliferation. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. March 2004, Vol.17, Issue 1, P.90. Available at:http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/741922_751318978_713661460.pdf . Accessed on: 2010-04-15.

[2] Wirtz, James. (2007) Weapons of Mass Destruction, In Collins, Allan,Contemporary Security Studies, New York: Oxford University Press, P. 277.

[3] Thakur, Ramesh. (2006) Chemical Weapons and the Challenge of WMD, In Thakur, Ramesh and Haru, Ere, The Chemical Weapons Convention- Implementation, Challenges and Opportunities, Tokyo: United Nations University, P.7. 

[4] Wirtz, James. (2007) Weapons of Mass Destruction, In Collins, Allan,Contemporary Security Studies, New York: Oxford University Press, P. 278.

[5] In the family of the WMD we group chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons.

[6] The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, (17 June 1925), Federation of American Scientists website, Available at:http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/geneva/text/geneva1.htm  Accessed on: 2010-04-16.

[7] Chemical Weapons Convention website, Available at:http://www.cwc.gov/ or OPCW website, Available at:http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/  Accessed on: 2010-04-16.

[8] Kimball G. Daryl and Meier, Oliver, The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance, Arms Control Today, Vol.38, (March 2008). Available at:http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance  Accessed on: 2010-04-16.

[9] Kimball G. Daryl and Meier, Oliver, The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance, Arms Control Today, Vol.38, (March 2008). Available at:http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance  Accessed on: 2010-04-16.

[10] Bismuth, Chantal, Borron, W. Stephen, Baud, J. Frederic, and Barriot, Patrick (2004) Chemical weapons: documented use and compounds on the horizon.Toxicology Letters, 1 April 2004, Vol.149, Issue 1-3, P.12. Available at:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleListURL&_method=list&_ArticleListID=1297895795&_sort=r&view=c&_acct=C000010399&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=126770&md5=62ff6b9f70be9c170f2f4731b8e0a821 Accessed on: 2010-04-16.

[11]  Asada, Masahiko. (2006) The Challenge Inspection System of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Problems and Prospects, In Thakur, Ramesh and Haru, Ere, The Chemical Weapons Convention- Implementation, Challenges and Opportunities, Tokyo: United NationsUniversity, P. 75-95.

[12] Ibid. P.77.

[13] Ibid. P. 84-85.

[14] Chemical Weapons Implementation Act of 1998, Sec 307. Available at:http://www.cwc.gov/cwc_authority_legislation_t3.html#topicSeven Accessed on: 2010-04-16.

[15] Chemical Weapons Convention website, Article 8, Para.9, 12, 22, Available at: http://www.cwc.gov/cwc_treaty_article_08.html Accessed on: 2010-04-16.

[16] Mathews J. Robert. (2006) The First Review of the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Drafter’s Perspective, In Thakur, Ramesh and Haru, Ere, The Chemical Weapons Convention- Implementation, Challenges and Opportunities, Tokyo: United Nations University, P.45.

[17] Chemical Weapons Convention website, Article 8, Para.22, Available at:http://www.cwc.gov/cwc_treaty_article_08.html Accessed on: 2010-04-16.

[1] Table 1.

[2] Batsanov, Sergey(2006) Approaching The 10^th  Anniversary of The Chemical Weapons Convention, The Non-proliferation Review, Vol. 13, Issue 2, P. 343. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700601012144  Accessed on: 2010-04-17.

[3] Organization for The Prohibition Of Chemical Weapons, OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter Addresses the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, (27 February 2009), Available at: http://www.opcw.org/nc/news/article/opcw-director-general-addresses-the-diplomatic-academy-of-vienna/ Accessed on: 2010-04-17.

[4] Thränert, Oliver and Tucker B. Jonathan, Freeing the World of Chemical Weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention at the Ten-Year Mark, SWP Research Paper 2007/RP 08, July 2007, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, P.18. Available at:http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/produkte/swp_studie.php?id=7867 Accessed on: 2010-04-17.

[5] Batsanov, Sergey(2006) Approaching The 10^th  Anniversary of The Chemical Weapons Convention, The Non-proliferation Review, Vol. 13, Issue 2, P. 344. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700601012144 Accessed on: 2010-04-17.

[6] Parshall W. George, Scientific and technical developments and the CWC, In The Chemical Weapons Convention – Implementation Challenges and Solutions, Tucker B. Jonathan (Ed.), Monterey Institute for International Studies, Monterey, CA, April 2001.

[7] Mahdi Balali-Mood, Pieter S. Steyn, Leiv K. Sydnes, and Ralf Trapp,Impact of Scientific Developments on The Chemical Weapons Convention (IUPAC Technical Report), International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, Vol.80, No 1, (2008), P.185-6, Available at:http://www.iupac.org/objID/Article/pac8001x0175 Accessed on: 2010-04-17.  

[8] Waysborta, Daniel, McGarvey J. David, Creasyc R. William , Morrisseyc M. Kevin,

Hendricksonc M. David, H. Dupont Durst, A decontamination system for chemical weapons agents using a liquid solution on a solid sorbent, Journal of Hazardous Materials, 30 January 2009, Vol. 161, Issue 2-3, P.1114-1121. Available at:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6TGF-4SD29W8-5&_user=126770&_coverDate=01/30/2009&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=1298649302&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000010399&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=126770&md5=e680b31516ca95feb410615620801d88                             Accessed on: 2010-04-17.

[9] Gee, John, Advances in Science and Technology. Maintaining The Effectiveness of The Chemical Weapons Convention, Pure and Applied Chemistry, Vol.74, No.12, (2002), P.2234. Available at:http://media.iupac.org/publications/pac/2002/pdf/7412x2229.pdf Accessed on: 2010-04-17.  

[10] Tolman  A. Chadwick and Parshall W. George, Fifty year trends in the chemical industry: What Do They Mean of Chemical Education?, Journal of Chemical Education, February 1999, Vol. 76, No.2, P.177–189. Available at:http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1021/ed076p177 Accessed on: 2010-04-17.

[11] Parshall W. George, Trends in processing and manufacturing that will affect implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Pure and Applied Chemistry, Vol.74, No.12, (2002), P. 2263. Available at:http://media.iupac.org/publications/pac/2002/pdf/7412x2259.pdf                           Accessed on: 2010-04-17.    

[12] Ibid. P.2262.

[13] Ouaghram Ben Sonia, Conversion of Russian chemical weapons production facilities,

The Nonproliferation Review Vol.7 Issue 2, (2000), P. 44-62. Available at:http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/113576_751318978_790415598.pdf  Accessed on: 2010-04-17.

[14] Tour M. James, Do-it-Yourself Chemical Weapons, Chemical and Engineering News, 10 July 2000, Vol. 78, No.28, P.42-5. Available at:http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~kekule/tourC&ENews.html Accessed on: 2010-04-17.  

[15] Kelliher, Marybeth, Terrorism. Industry Prevention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, Pure and Applied Chemistry, Vol.74, No.12, P.2278. Available at: http://old.iupac.org/publications/pac/2002/pdf/7412x2277.pdfAccessed on: 2010-04-17.

[16] Organization for The Prohibition Of Chemical Weapons, OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter Addresses the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, (27 February 2009), Available at:http://www.opcw.org/nc/news/article/opcw-director-general-addresses-the-diplomatic-academy-of-vienna/ Accessed on: 2010-04-17.

[17] Feakes, Daniel, Getting Down to the Hard Cases: Prospects for CWC Universality, Arms Control Today, Vol.38, (March 2008), Available at:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_03/Feakes    Accessed on: 2010-04-17.

[18] Organization for The Prohibition of Chemical Weapons website, Available at: http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/non-member-states/Accessed on: 2012-09-10.

[19] Action Plan for the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, OPCW Document, EC-M-23/DEC.3, (24 October 2003), Available at:http://www.opcw.org/search/?search=EC-M-23/DEC.3 Accessed on: 2010-04-17.

[20] Meier, Oliver, No Time for Complacency: Adapting the Chemical Weapons Convention for the Future, Arms Control Today, (March 2008), Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/CWC2008_READERWEB.pdfAccessed on: 2010-04-17.

[21] Resolution 1540, Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, UN Secutiry Council Resolutions, S/RES/1540, (28 April 2004), Available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement

Accessed on: 2010-04-17.

[22] Wirtz, James. (2007) Weapons of Mass Destruction, In Collins, Allan,Contemporary Security Studies, New York: Oxford University Press, P. 279.

[23] Mir, Hamid, Osama Claims He Has Nukes: If US Uses N-Arms It Will Get Same Response, Dawn.Com, 10 November 2001, Available at:http://www.dawn.com/2001/11/10/top1.htm Accessed on: 2010-04-17.

[24] Ryukichi, Imai, (2002), Weapons of Mass Destruction: Major Wars, Regional Conflicts, and Terrorism, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol.9, Issue 1, P.94, Available at:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13439000220141613 Accessed on: 2010-04-17.

[25] Dolnik, Adam, Die and Let Die: Exploring Links between Suicide Terrorism and Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 1 January 2003, Vol.26, No.1, P.30-1, Available at:http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/uter/2003/00000026/00000001/art00002       Accessed on: 2010-04-17.   

[26] Baylis, John and Smith, Mark, (2007), The Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction, In Baylis John, Wirtz James, Gray S. Colin, and Cohen Eliot,Strategy In The Contemporary World, 2^nd ed, New York: Oxford University Press, P. 239-245.

[27] The text of Aspin’s speech is available at:http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd18.htm Accessed on: 2010-04-17.

[28] Davis S. Zachary, (1994), US Counterproliferation Policy: Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, P.9.

[29] White House, (2003), National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Feb. Available at:http://www.whitehouse.gov Accessed on: 2010-04-17. 

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